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Abstract 
From a geographic perspective, the island of Crete in the south of the Aegean was well-
positioned to engage in the rapidly expanding trade networks of the Mediterranean that 
flourished in the wake of the death of Alexander the Great. Ancient literary sources tell us that 
these maritime routes through which goods flowed were often plagued by ‘pirates’, roaming 
independently of any hegemonic rule. On the basis of Polybius, the most popular (modern and 
ancient) theory is that Hellenistic Crete was a center of this pirate activity. Powerful ruling cities 
like Rhodes, attacked Crete in the 3rd c. BC with the professed intent to destroy any pirate threat 
housed there. The mirage is that Crete is an island full of pirates, liars, and greedy citizens has 
continued in modern scholarship. This “Cretan Mirage” has had the effects of perpetuating the 
stereotypes of ancient Crete and marginalizing it within studies of the Hellenistic period. Paula 
Perlman first proposed that the “Cretan Mirage” was at work in the depictions of the First Cretan 
war (Perlman, 1992, 151-153). Here I go further to suggest that the “Cretan Mirage” has blinded 
scholars to other valid arguments about Cretan history and economics during the Hellenistic 
period. First, I will place Hellenistic Crete within its broader Aegean context, and, using 
archaeological and literary data, then I will compare the political and economic position of Crete 
to another major economic power in the Aegean, Rhodes. Finally, through a close examination 
of Crete’s role in the Mediterranean-wide trade I will argue that the “Cretan Mirage” is in fact a 
mirage. Crete was not solely inhabited by pirates, its people were not purely liars and full of 
greed. Rather, Crete was very much like any other island in the Aegean. I will also argue that 
Crete’s economic success and impact on the Aegean was similar in many way to Rhodes’. This 
conclusion should encourage a re-evaluation of the political and economic struggles that 
characterize the Hellenistic Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean in the 3rd and 2nd c. BC.
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CHAPTER 1 
Reviewing Modern Scholarship on Crete 
There is an endemic marginalization of Crete in modern scholarship. In the index to Peter 
Green’s seminal book on the Hellenistic period, From Alexander to Actium: The Historical 
Evolution of the Hellenistic Age, there are eight references to Crete and/or Cretans:1 one depicts 
Cretans as liars, five highlight Crete only in terms of its pirates or piracy, one discusses a Cretan 
inscription on Orphism, and the last is written in relation to the Roman take over of Greece. By 
comparison, the nearby island of Rhodes has 124 references – almost an entire column to itself in 
the index.2 Smaller Delos, a commercial port in the middle of the Aegean, has 36.3 This is not 
only found in Green’s history, however.  In Graham Shipley’s book, The Greek World After 
Alexander (323-30BC), the index lists three references to Crete generally, with a note directing 
the reader to investigate Crete further through referencing “particular places” and tellingly 
“piracy”.4 The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World mentions Crete twice: once to 
note that Crete had no economic change during the Hellenistic period and once to note Crete’s 
small contribution to the wealth of material culture found in Greece.5 Last, Blackwell’s A 
Companion to the Hellenistic World provides a much more rounded view of Crete, but this more 
recent resource still lacks an in-depth full chapter on Hellenistic Crete.6 These resources 
exemplify the current attitudes in general works towards Hellenistic Crete, wherein the majority 
                                                 
1 Peter Green, Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 208, 302, 306, 449, 558, 592, 656, 675. 
2 Ibid., 962. 
3 Ibid., 943. 
4 Graham Shipley, The Greek World After Alexander (323-30 BC) (New York: Routledge, 2000), 552. 
5 Glenn Bugh, ed. The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 90, 151. 
6 Andrew Erskine, ed. A Companion to the Hellenistic World (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); See Susan 
Alcock, Jennifer Gates, and Jane Rempel, “Reading the Landscape: Survey Archaeology and the Hellenistic 
Oikoumene,” in A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 
367-71. 
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is focused upon the piracy of Crete, or perhaps more generally, its negative reputation. Primarily, 
they show the exclusion of Crete from broader topics – such as the general history and 
economicsof the period. It is important to note that these general works may leave out Crete due 
to the difficult source material, since it is incomplete and not easily found or dealt with, and the 
lack of secondary scholarship. Even so, I will argue that a more prominent reason for the 
exclusion is due to the marginalization of Crete within ancient Greek thought and the influence 
of the “Cretan Mirage”.7  
Due to the reliance on literary sources, namely Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo, 
the discrepancy between ancient and modern conceptions of piracy, the misconception of Crete’s 
mercenary economy, and the influence of the “Cretan Mirage” on interpretations of 
archaeological data, Crete has been disconnected from the mainstream history of the Hellenistic 
World and effectively marginalized. As a result, scholars who come across Crete within their 
research tend to perpetuate the stereotypes of the “Cretan Mirage”, which depict Cretans as 
greedy, lying, pirates. The main focus of this thesis is to examine the evidence for both the 
marginalization of Crete within scholarship and the perpetuation of the “Cretan Mirage” as well 
as to evaluate the archaeological evidence for an alternate perception of the history of Hellenistic 
Crete.  Using the following chapters that will contextualize Crete within the Hellenistic Aegean, 
outline broad economic theory, consider a case study on Rhodes, and analyze the literary sources 
and archaeological evidence, I will dispel the “Cretan Mirage” and postulate that Crete was an 
important economic force in the Hellenistic Aegean, like the neighboring island of Rhodes, and 
that this success contributed to the slanderous reputation it has in ancient literature.  
                                                 
7 These phenomena are described by Paula Perlman in “Kretes aei leistai? The Marginalization of Crete in Greek 
Thought and the Role of Piracy in the Outbreak of the First Cretan War," in Hellenistic Rhodes, edited by Vincent 
Gabrielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 132-61. See also Chapter 4 on Hellenistic Crete on page 48. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Hellenistic Aegean: A Broader Perspective 
The story of the Hellenistic Mediterranean is one of war, profound cultural 
transformation, ideological shifts, territorial flux, economic ebbs and flows, and political 
dominance. From the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC until the Ptolemies lose control of 
Egypt to Rome in 31 BC, this period of history is change in essence.8 As Alexander lay dying in 
Babylon, he had only one true heir to the throne: his Macedonian wife Roxane’s unborn child, 
unfit to claim the massive empire Alexander would soon leave behind.9 With no one to inherit 
his position at his death, a dispute began over ownership to the lands of Macedonia, Egypt, 
Persia, and mainland Greece. So began the Wars of the Diadochi, in which several of 
Alexander’s relatives and most successful generals waged war and used political strategy to 
conquer regions.  It was not until 276 BC that there were three distinct successor kingdoms with 
solid control over territories.10 The Ptolemies ruled Egypt, the Antigonids held Macedonia, and 
the Seleukids controlled Asia. The fighting would not end there, however. Alexander’s lasting 
influence impressed upon his generals the absolute necessity of regional dominance, imperial 
expansion, and monarchical hierarchies.11 Dynamic hegemonic political strategies would 
continue to move borders for the next three centuries, finally ending when Rome incorporated 
Greece into its own empire.  
                                                 
8 Glenn Bugh, “Introduction,” The Cambridge Companion, xix-xxii; Erskine, A Companion, 2; There is some debate 
as to exactly when the Hellenistic period ended and when the Roman period began, depending on how one defines 
Rome’s influence and level of control. 31 BC is the traditionally accepted date, which I will use here. 
9 Winthrop Adams, “The Hellenistic Kingdoms,” The Cambridge Companion, 28-30; There were other claims to the 
throne through Alexander’s bloodline, though none were quite as legitimate as Roxane’s unborn child. 
10 Green, From Alexander to Actium, 134; There is some difference in dates here for the end of the wars of the 
Diadochi. David Braund ends this period in 281 BC with the Battle of Koroupedion and the murder of Seleukos 
(David Braund, “After Alexander: The Emergence of the Hellenistic World, 323-281,” A Companion, 33.), though 
Graham Shipley, along with Bugh and Green, attributes the new period after the wars to the takeover of Macedonia 
by Antigonos Gonatas (Shipley, The Greek World, 107.).  
11 Green, From Alexander to Actium, 187. 
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The development of these kingdoms is only a piece of the larger interplay of change with 
which Greece was dealing with at this time. Alexander had stretched Greece’s borders from the 
mainland to India, as north as Macedonia, and south to Egypt. As part of this growth, Alexander 
founded cities in Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Media, Baktria, and a few in 
Egypt.12 War, booty, land, and opportunities for class advancement called tens of thousands of 
Greeks away from their homelands.13 This movement of people and goods set the stage for the 
Hellenistic Aegean to turn into an ancient ‘superhighway’ and provides an opportunity to 
analyze the economic status of individual regions and their interactions with other regions.  
In the opposite direction, these empires opened trade routes, which allowed people from 
Ionia, Southwest Asia, and Egypt to immigrate and travel to Greece, bringing with them new 
ideologies, religions, languages, traditions, and material culture. Furthermore, even as the Wars 
of the Diadochi settled, these trade routes continued to be immensely valuable for military and 
economic purposes. Each kingdom relied heavily on imports such as foodstuffs, pitch, wood, 
slaves, and metals. There are several cases in the Hellenistic period where these hegemonic kings 
would go to great lengths to protect these interests or gain monopolies to control them.14 From a 
military perspective, gaining key islands or footholds in the Aegean allowed kings to station 
garrisons, dispatch diplomatic relations, or successfully maintain supply lines.15 Politically, it is 
important to understand that though the Ptolemiaic, Antigonid, and Seleukid kingdoms were 
large-scale entities, the Aegean was home to smaller players that had a notable impact on trade 
and commerce in the region. Within the Cyclades, the city of Delos became an important 
                                                 
12 Richard Billows, “Cities”, A Companion, 198. 
13Shipley, The Greek World, 57.  
14 See Vincent Gabrielsen “Profitable Partnerships: Monopolies, Traders, Kings, and Cities,” in The Economies of 
Hellenistic Societies: Third to First Century BC, ed. Zofia Archibald and John Davies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 216-50. 
15 Gary Reger, Delos. Regionalism and change in the economy of independent Delos, 314-167 BC (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 20-6. 
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religious center and middle-ground for merchants and military ventures because it connected the 
Ionian coast, mainland Greece, and the northern Aegean (see Map 1). Further to the south lay 
wealthy Rhodes. In addition to creating its own hegemonic sphere and vast trade network, 
Rhodes also possessed one of the most advanced navies in the Aegean, likened to that of Athens 
in the Classical period.16 This navy placed Rhodes on a similar military level to the larger 
kingdoms, allowing it to participate in larger-scale political issues. Rome was also a key factor, 
especially beginning in the 2nd c. BC, because of its growing influence on Greece and the Aegean 
impacted military operations, trade, and treaties. 
                                                 
16 Vincent Gabrielsen, The Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1997), 85. 
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It is within this context that one can begin to paint a picture of general political and 
economic issues of the Hellenistic Aegean that will greatly influence the entire Mediterranean 
region. Significantly, mainland Greece and Macedonia were under the rule of Antigonos Gonatus 
(from 277/271 BC until his death in 239 BC) and were not, by any means, equivalent to a united 
Greece.17 Many Greek cities were full of rebellious intentions and were still vying for 
independence. This tension was exacerbated by the newly founded Achaean League (280 BC) 
and the Aetolian League, both of whom tirelessly attempted to rid Greece of Macedonian 
domination.18 Polybius describes the twelve members of the Achaean League as so unified and 
determined in their goal that he says “In general there is no difference between the entire 
Peloponnese and a single city except that its inhabitants are not included within the same wall . . 
.”, though Peter Green debates whether or not this is a reflection of Polybius’ bias as an Achaean 
man himself.19  
Green also states that in Greece during the early 3rd c. BC “the uneasy tension between 
local autonomy and Macedonian lordship continued, further complicated by the Ptolemies’ 
hostility to Antigonid expansion in the Aegean . . .”20 While the Ptolemies allied themselves with 
Sparta and any other anti-Macedonian entities on the mainland, they also were fighting the 
Antigonids for control of the Aegean through naval superiority – an economic necessity as well 
as a political defense mechanism. 21 It was at this point that Antiochus II of the Seleukids allied 
with Macedonia in 261 BC and began to fight the Ptolemies in the Second Syrian War.22 
Meanwhile, by the beginning of the 2nd c. BC, independent Rhodes began to become extremely 
                                                 
17 Peter Green, The Hellenistic Age: A Short History (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2007), 136-
37. 
18 Ibid, 71. 
19 Polybius, Histories, 2.37.7-38 
20 Green, The Hellenistic Age, 70-71 
21 Green, From Alexander to Actium, 147. 
22 Ibid., 148. 
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wealthy through trade due to its position at the “intersection of all the major Mediterranean 
shipping routes, from Egypt, Cyprus, and Phoenicia to the Aegean and the Black Sea, as well as 
Italy and North Africa.”23 This wealth helped it build its immense navy, which it used to support 
different superpowers to increase its own growing sphere of influence. In the southern Aegean, 
Crete had a strategic central position for many of these maritime routes. This discussion of the 
3rd-century politics illustrates the types of power shifts that were common in this period in the 
Aegean – a constant back and forth between large kingdoms with support from smaller entities.   
It is important to examine the different types of material evidence from the Hellenistic 
period in order to clearly understand the implications of each type. Archeological evidence, 
particularly, can provide information that we cannot glean from the literary evidence. Even 
though there is much inscriptional evidence, there is a comparative lack of contemporary 
literature for the period, meaning we must understand Hellenistic culture, societal structure, 
militaristic strategy, and ideologies through archaeological data. With a resurgence of academic 
interest in the period after Alexander’s death for the past twenty-five years, there is a wealth of 
new scholarly theories, recently published archaeological investigation, and more detailed 
analyses into our literary evidence. Scholarly interest funnels money into programs and 
departments, allowing for research opportunities and providing for a restructuring of the world’s 
previous understanding of the Hellenistic period. The material evidence is growing so rapidly 
that interpretations accepted even twenty years ago are revised rapidly. Glenn Bugh stated in the 
introduction to the Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World (2006) that “[The Hellenistic 
period] can no longer be called a neglected or discredited field, certainly not among the 
increasing number of scholars who have taken up the cause. . .”24 I would agree, and go even 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 378 
24 Bugh, “Introduction”, 6. 
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further to state that this field is the one with the most potential for breakthroughs, since scholars 
must combine literary and archaeological evidence. However, the complex history of the 
Hellenistic kingdoms gives just a small hint towards the difficulties of attempting to assign 
definite dates to evidence. Furthermore, there are a multitude of ancient languages to deal with in 
the literary and epigraphic evidence, due to the lasting effects of Alexander’s empire. While most 
Classicists are well versed in Greek and Latin, the languages of the Near East and Asia are 
outside their usual training. Perhaps Andrew Erskine describes the study of 323 BC – 30 BC best 
in this way: 
The body of evidence is growing all the time. A satisfactory narrative may be 
elusive but the variety and richness of the source material gives the historian the 
chance to confront other questions and issues . . . The challenge lies in combining 
all this evidence, material that often pulls in different directions.25  
 
I will begin by discussing the evidence that is most relevant to a study of the Hellenistic 
Aegean. These include literary, epigraphic, and coin evidence, as well as an evaluation of 
transport amphora. By highlighting the specific attributes and interpretation issues of each, I 
hope to organize a base from which to more completely contextualize the Aegean. Following this 
discussion, I will focus on the role of regional analysis within a broad overview of economic 
theory from the Hellenistic period, for both are crucial to a well-rounded understanding of the 
Aegean and of Crete its historical context.  
Literature 
 As mentioned above, contemporary literary sources for the Hellenistic period are limited. 
Additionally, most of the literature proves difficult to gain any specific regional information 
from, as they tend to be broad historical narratives. Very little has survived to modern times, and 
what has survived is fragmentary. Of all of the authors that may be mentioned in an analysis of 
                                                 
25Andrew Erskine, “Approaching the Hellenistic World,” A Companion, 4.  
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Hellenistic literature, it seems that Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo are the richest 
sources.26 Each work is a product of the author’s approach to their topic and influenced by the 
historical context in which it was written, so an examination of each of these authors is necessary 
gain an awareness of the possible limitations of their utility.  It should be noted that this 
discussion will be about historical narratives, instead of poetry or philosophy texts. Though 
useful in other contexts, poetry and philosophy cannot provide much in terms of interpretation of 
specific events, dates, and broader economic theory. 
To begin, Polybius of Megalopolis is the best historian we have for the period between 
220 and 146 BC, due to the fact that the first five of his forty books are intact and that he was 
writing about contemporary events.27 Born around 220 BC, Polybius was raised in an aristocratic 
Achaean family and he soon rose to be commander of the Achaean League.28 Although he was 
quite familiar with Roman generals because of his position, he was deported to Rome in 170 BC 
to be examined for anti-Roman sentiment. It was there that his career as a historian would take 
off.29 He traveled extensively, visiting Africa, Spain, and Gaul, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and 
perhaps Rhodes, which most certainly would have given him sufficient perspective on Roman 
conquest to write his main work. The Histories is focused on the rise of the Roman Empire (both 
in general and in Greece) and how its glory was so swiftly attained.30  His approach to history 
was one of pragmatism and realism. In Polybius’ own words:  
 
                                                 
26 Green, From Alexander to Actium, xix; There are many contemporary authors which have been lost to us, 
including Douris of Samos, Hieronymus of Cardia, Poseidonius, Phylarchus, Timaisos of Tauromenion, and authors 
from the period of Alexander as well, Aristoboulos of Kassandreia, Kallisthenes of Olynthos, Kleitarchos, and 
Ptolemy I of Egypt. See also Erskine, “Approaching the Hellenistic World”, 5-6.    
27 Green, From Alexander to Actium, 269. 
28Jeffrey Henderson, “Introduction”, Polybius’ The Histories ed. Jeffrey Henderson, Trans. W. R. Paton, Revis. 
Frank W. Walbank and Christian Habicht (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), xii.  
29 F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 3. 
30 Ibid., 4-5 
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For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact 
opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the 
whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by the study of the 
interconnection of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we 
are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and 
pleasure from a history.31  
 
Therefore we can take into account that Polybius most certainly desired to tell the truth of 
history, in its entirety. Many scholars believe that he fails to keep to that personal goal quite 
frequently. However, we must also understand that any historian must write to an audience – in 
this case it is debated whether or not that audience was primarily Roman or Greek.32 
Furthermore, it seems that Polybius was quite fond of calling upon Tyche, god of fortune, as a 
source of constant explanation when events have no reason or meaning.33This is an interesting 
footnote, due to his wish to be as rational as possible. Keeping in mind as well that he was an 
“individual, an Arcadian, a Greek, a former soldier and statesman,” as well as highly influenced 
by the Roman Scipio, his biases will sometimes be focused in those directions.34 As for his 
credibility, his sources are sound. The only other issue found in using Polybius exclusively is 
that 35 of his books in The Histories are fragmentary (even if some of those books are mostly 
intact). Polybius then, remains our most contemporary, complete, relatively straightforward, and 
least biased source, despite the few issues above. 
                                                 
31 Polybius, 1.4.11-1.6.2, 15, trans. W. R. Paton (1922-27). 
32 There are three differing views put forth on Polybius’ intended audience: Peter Green states that “Despite polite 
genuflections to his Roman readers, he was really aiming at Greeks.” (Green, Alexander to Actium, 271); Henderson 
says that “It was aimed at Roman readers, a clear sign that Romans were able to read Greek, but that the author also 
had a Greek audience in mind.” (Henderson, Polybius’ The Histories, xv); F. W. Walbank believes that “Usually, 
however, it is not clear to what particular audience Polybius is directing his frequent didactic observations on the 
advantages that will accrue from reading his work. . .” (Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 7). I am 
inclined to believe Walbank, due to the possibility that Polybius’ could be trying to please several audiences without 
alienating either, although Green and Henderson have the benefit of more recent investigation and compelling 
arguments.  
33 For instance, Henderson, “Introduction”, xxiv – xxv; Walbank, A Historical Commentary, 17. 
34 Green, Alexander to Actium (1993), 273. One of Polybius’ sources is also Zeno, a Rhodian historian with an 
exaggerated sense of Rhodian excellence – this will also account for some of Polybius’ bias. See Perlman, “The 
Marginalization of Crete,” 133. 
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 Diodorus Siculus was born in 90 BC in the Sicilian town of Agyrion, and he probably 
died there as well.35 He spent most of his life traveling and spent thirty years on composing the 
Historical Library, a monumental history of the world up to his time in the 1st c. BC.36 This work 
originally comprised of forty books - as in the case of Polybius – though there are some who 
believe that the work was originally forty-two books, with Diodorus skimming the work down in 
order to create a more idealized historical narrative.37 It is clear through all of the scholarship on 
Diodorus that he was highly influenced by his sources, especially those of Ephorus and his 
contemporary Livy.38 The variety in his sources, his rational take on history, and his continuity – 
all make Diodorus’ work a valuable rarity in ancient literature. Unfortunately, much of this work 
has been lost but his books 17-20, which are focused on the Hellenistic period’s militaristic 
incidences, survive.39 However, it would seem that most modern scholars avoid using his work, 
the Historical Library. As to why that may be, the answer could lay in his confusing use of 
multiple sources - Ephorus, Timaeus, Hieronymus of Cardia, Polybius, and Posidonius - creating 
for what some call an “unintelligible farrago”.40 In 1993, Peter Green even goes so far as to 
remark that “Diodorus . . . is a third rate compiler only as good as his source: This makes him, at 
times, of great value, but not on his own account. . .”, and furthermore, Green scathingly remarks 
that he will not create “another imaginative analysis of [Diodorus’] chronological inconsistencies 
and synthetic rhetoric.”41 However, there has been a recent resurgence in using Diodorus as a 
                                                 
35 Peter Green, Diodorus Siculus, Books 11-12.37.1: Greek History 480-431 B.C., the Alternative Version (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2006), 3.  
36 Ibid., 4-7. 
37 Catherine Rubincam, “How Many Books Did Diodorus Siculus Originally Intend to Write?” The Classical 
Quarterly 48.1(1998): 233. 
38 Ibid., 230.  
39 Michel Austin, The Hellenistic World from Alexander to The Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in 
Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7. 
40 Robert Drews, “Diodorus and His Sources”, American Journal of Philology 83.4 (1962): 383-92. 
41 Green, Alexander to Actium, xix; It should be noted that Green recants this argument in his later book Diodorus 
Siculus, x, xiv, wherein he states that “. . . Diodorus, properly examined, turns out to be a rational, methodical, if 
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viable resource, and this is because scholars have begun to reject these negative stereotypes, 
which riddle 19th century works on his Historical Library. As Kenenth Sacks states, “A recent 
study of Diodorus' writing style reveals that he was no simple copyist of his current main source, 
but rather that he possessed sufficient independence of mind to rewrite narrative in his own 
words.”42 He is our only consistent chronological source, providing continuity from the Persian 
wars through the wars of the Diadochi, and even more bits and pieces throughout the end of the 
4th century.  
 Finally Strabo of Amasia is a Classicists’ familiar friend. He lived from approximately 64 
BC through 23 CE (at least), and in that time his main work of history was his Geography, in 
which he intended to “represent the world as a whole, rather than individual regions in 
microcosm.”43 We have all but book seven of his Geography, though the work as a whole was 
meant to be a sequel to Polybius’ Histories.44  His sources are varied and sound, his work 
influential and respected, and Strabo remains one of our great resources for the Hellenistic 
period. To create such a work, he traveled extensively. In his own words:  
I have travelled westward from Armenia as far as the regions of Tyrrhenia 
opposite Sardinia, and southward from the Black Sea as far as the frontiers of 
Ethiopia. And you could not find another person among the writers on geography 
who has travelled over much more of the distances just mentioned than I. 45 
 
                                                 
somewhat unimaginative, minor historian, who planned on a large scale, and was quite capable of seeing major 
faults and inconsistencies provided he lived to correct them. . . Here I must take refuge . . . in Walt Whitman’s 
cheerful apophthegm: ‘Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself.’” 
42 Kenneth Sacks, “The Lesser Prooemia of Diodorus Siculus” in Hermes, 110.4 (1982): 434. 
43 Daniela Dueck, Hugh Lindsay, and Sarah Pothecary, ed. Strabo’s Cultural Geography: The Making of a 
Kolossourgia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 
44 Dueck, Lindsay, and Pothecary, Strabo’s Cultural Geography, 1. 
45 Strabo, Geography, 2.5.11, C117, in Daniela Dueck’s Strabo of Amasia: A Greek Man of Letters in Augustan 
Rome (New York: Routledge, 2000), 15-16.  
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Not only was he well-traveled, but he was well educated - taught by the best Greek teachers an 
aristocratic family could provide. 46According to Dueck, Lindsay, and Pothecary, there are two 
ways to analyze Strabo: a regional examination, or a thematic one, each with their own 
advantages and disadvantages.47 Regionally, we can understand Strabo as he recounts his 
Geography in terms of areas divided culturally, ethnically, politically (the distinctions of which 
will be further explained below) and as a more objective historian. If we use the thematic 
approach, one can understand Strabo as more subjectively present in his narrative with 
boundaries of culture and polities crossing continually.48 
 Interestingly, it would seem that although Strabo is providing a history that is broad 
enough to include many different cultures, his overall view of those cultures is still quite 
influenced by the Classical ideal of Greeks versus ‘barbarians’. Eran Algamor puts Strabo’s view 
in these terms: “As a person raided in the Hellenic tradition and imbued with its set of values, he 
adopts the classical ethnic dichotomy, and mostly rejects Hellenistic revisionist attitudes, which 
tried to adapt the old division to the changing ethnological realities.”49 This is important to keep 
in mind while using Strabo as a source for the Hellenistic Aegean, as during this time period the 
Aegean would have seen more foreigners than it ever had before, immigrating, trading, and 
offering themselves as mercenaries. For a region with so much variation, Strabo’s viewpoint may 
not have been the same as those living in that area and this is a crucial point to recognize.  
Epigraphic Evidence 
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Inscriptions are by far our most prolific source for the Hellenistic Aegean. Inscriptions 
provide insight into what was thought important enough to record in stone, including evidence 
for individual honors, details of economic and political transactions between cities, and local and 
regional politics. This epigraphic data gives a surprising amount of detail on the everyday lives 
of those living in the Hellenistic Aegean. Inscriptions detail various topics, such as temple 
accounts, Greek city assemblies and council decrees, and royal letters and decrees.50 Most 
inscriptions found by archaeologists have been reused as building materials, so many original 
contexts cannot be reconstructed exactly.51 We are also limited by the fact that most of our urban 
inscriptional evidence is fragmented.52 When scholars try to reconstruct the pieces which are 
fragmented, often times they do so through using the formulaic building blocks of most honorary 
epigrams, which are generally correct.53  
Arguably even more problematic than reconstructing missing words for a certain 
inscription is determining the date at which it was written. If we cannot assign a date or time 
period for the information given, then it is impossible to understanding its true meaning. We 
cannot use the information out of context. Often times, scholars use the style of the writing of 
Greek found in order to determine the inscriber of the inscription, and then use that information 
to approximate date that the epigraph was written.54 To do so, someone must learn the writer’s 
precise stylistic method for inscribing each letter, and all of that writer’s unique minute stylistic 
details. From there, the scholar must scour inscriptional records to find the closest match to the 
style of the writer in question – it is here where another person may have published that same 
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writer’s other inscriptional work, perhaps with a date through archaeological context or upon the 
stone itself.55 This entire process is called the ‘study of hands’.56 Though this method may seem 
to have too much subjectivity to be precise, it is relatively accurate. In fact, newly created 
computer systems which use mathematical algorithms may completely remove human error, 
allowing for the most complete connections to be made between the various works of a single 
stonecutter.57 
However, even with these issues, inscriptions give us information that can tell us clearly 
about populations, interactions, and transactions between poleis and even regions. They can also 
tell us what kinds of things people were honored for – recording the causes for a city to give 
thanks or celebrate. The valuable information given to us is well worth the difficult and often 
variable translation process.  
Numismatic Evidence 
When studying the Hellenistic Aegean, numismatics, or the study of ancient coins, is an 
important one.  One of the most useful ways of interpreting finds of coins in this period are by 
looking at commercial connections between regions and highlighted by those patterns of 
monetary exchange. For instance, Panagopoulou sees that “the respective distribution of the 
Antigonid silver issues predominately reflects local preferences in transactions.” 58 For 
Panagopoulou, this means we can use numismatics to infer who was trading with whom, 
although even here we must have caution, because direct trade is not always the reality. It may 
be that one person trades with another, who then continues trading with the same coin, leading to 
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the coin transferring hands between several poleis and between several states without direct 
contact. But if a coin makes it far enough, an implication can be made about the value of the coin 
or its importance to the market because of its high circulation throughout a large geographical 
region. Cities could also create their own coinage under the sovereignty of a ruler, or under their 
own sovereignty. This independent unregulated coinage continues throughout the Hellenistic 
period through to the Roman period, where Romans placed a state of controlled coinage upon 
Greece.59 Often if a polis was large enough and/or independent they would create their own 
coins, resulting in localized monetization. We must not think that the production of coins is as it 
is today however. Thomas Martin states that  
…the numismatic, historical, documentary, and literary evidence uniformly fails 
to support the idea that there was an operative in the classical Greek world a 
strongly felt connection between an abstract notion of sovereignty and the right of 
coinage which implied the necessity to enforce a uniform monetary circulation.60  
 
Unregulated coins mean that we get “fashion coins”, which are often misleading for 
attempting to piece together a chronology of power shifts within regions. Andrew Meadows 
discusses the lex Seyrig’s impracticality in light of these “fashion coins” – an outdated academic 
law within numismatics which argues that “no state issued coin in its own name if it was ruled by 
another.”61 Meadows rejects the lex Seyrig, citing several examples where states would 
independently create coins while under another’s rule, and then create “fashion coins” minted 
with the faces of monarchs who may have previously ruled the region because the coinage itself 
was worth enough or prized enough that it was worthwhile to replicate it. It is only in 
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conjunction with other evidence or detailed analysis that we can tell which coins are fashion 
coins, and thus move forward with a correct chronology.   
Transport Amphorae 
The Hellenistic Aegean was actively engaged in commerce, and trade routes that cross 
through the region were paramount for political entities and their hegemonic goals. Commercial 
interactions between cities in this region are clearly demonstrated by the distribution of transport 
amphorae; these ceramic indicators can tell us where items came from, who was using them, and 
possibly what was being traded. Each city had their own ‘brand’ of transport amphora, in that the 
shapes, clay, and stamps upon them were unique to their location of origin. They could be used 
to transport wine, oil, grain, dried figs, gourds, firewood or virtually any commodity that could 
fit within its wide mouth.62 Mark Lawall urges caution in equating discovery of amphora to a 
direct connection between its origins and the new found location, however. “Rhodian stamps at 
Carthage do not themselves indicate that any Rhodian merchant, or even non-Rhodian ship 
originating at Rhodes, ever landed at Carthage,” he claims.63 This is due to indirect trade – either 
on account of strictly economic, socio-economic, or cultural reasons. For example, offloading 
mixed cargo through several ports, re-filling and re-exportation, movement between estates or 
for military operations, and private merchants will shift the reality of amphorae locations.64 
Lawall concludes by saying that “Only on a case-by-case basis is it possible to explain 
chronological and geographical patterns of distribution.”65 It can seem very enticing to use 
amphora to make broad assumptions of trade interactions, though we must remember that these 
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items were not simply one-time use, one-time function, nor had one-time movement. These 
dynamic pieces of material culture had unique individual stories. The key is to use all pieces of 
evidence available from the amphorae.  
The fabric, or material from which the amphorae are made, can significantly challenge 
our perceptions of where these amphorae originated. Using petrographic analysis, archaeologists 
can now determine the exact source of sand or clay that was used to make the amphora. Natalia 
Vogeikoff-Brogan and Stavroula Apostolakou recently used such methods to source amphorae 
from two sites on Crete (Mochlos and Pyrgos-Myrtos), indicating that the clay used to create 
them was from the area of ancient Hierapytna on Crete – now labeled East Cretan Cream Ware 
(ECCW).66 Information using such scientific technology can then show that even in cases where 
it would be impossible to identify sources through provenience, stamps, or other missing 
identification markers, we can still discover the source of the amphorae.  
More information can be gleaned from transport amphorae than simply the movement of 
goods, however. John Lund has used amphorae evidence found in Egypt to provide a rough 
estimate of the average output of Rhodian wine trade, and then extrapolates that information to 
estimate climate variability.67  He concluded that the economy of Rhodian wine was in flux, 
creating ebbs and flows that can then tell us much about the economic situation for Rhodes and 
its trade partners. He also discussed how regional climates should be “regarded as one of the 
‘engines’ that kept the inter-regional trade going’.68 Such research does, of course, have its 
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limitations, but it is a testament to the many different ways creativity in the field can lead to new 
conclusions. Even Lund admits in the study above that “The main conclusion to be drawn from 
this chapter is that we still have a lot to learn about the modalities of wine production and trade 
of Rhodes.”69 Many other recent studies use amphora stamps to indicate broad patterns of trade. 
Amphora stamps and petrographic analysis are the two most reliable ways to determine the 
origin of an amphora.70  
Stamps are not, however, always as clear as they may seem. Lawall, again, challenges us 
to think beyond stamps and their broad conclusions or insufficient data: 
The over-emphasis on amphora stamps has meant that . . . the only significant 
amphora publications from Rhodes are the local stamps. Was Rhodes a 
transshipping center with a similar mix of sources as pre-230s Athens? Or was 
Rhodes more of an importing-exporting center, like nearby Ephesos? . . . The 
choice for historians of Hellenistic economies – whether they are ‘historians’ or 
‘archaeologists’ – is clear: either remain bogged down in the current pessimistic 
stalemate blaming lack of the necessary data, or exploit the existing data to form 
new questions, propose new models, and, ultimately, begin to organize and 
understand the myriad developments that comprise Hellenistic economic 
history.71 
 
It is with this challenge in mind that transport amphorae can continue to be used to extrapolate 
enough data and interpretations to expand our knowledge of the Hellenistic Aegean.  
Regional Analysis 
Economically, the Hellenistic Aegean is characterized by interactions on ‘local’, 
‘regional’, and ‘interregional’ levels. Evidence for these transactions comes from finds of coins, 
transport amphorae, ancient literature and inscriptions.72 “Greece is made up from many different 
landscapes,” writes Graham Oliver, “intra-regional variability must be given greater emphasis. A 
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more localized focus will highlight the immediate problems that were presented to a 
community.”73 As Gary Reger points out, the ability to distinguish each of these levels is of 
paramount importance when constructing an argument for economic policy, trade, and political 
interactions. According to Reger, there are three types of overlapping regions, which can be used 
to later ascertain the separation of larger regions: geographic, ethnic, and political.74 
Geographical regions can be determined based on features such as mountain ranges, lakes, rivers, 
coastlines, and other land features that could divide people. These landmarks also impact how 
easily trade and interactions can be between different areas – it is much easier to walk across a 
valley to speak to a neighbor than to scale a mountain. Often times, these geographies impact 
subsistence, which impacts culture.75 For example, subsistence patterns will influence traditions 
of food, occupations, placements of households, tool use, and much more. Ethnic regions may 
vary from the geographical regions, though they are linked. These ethnic regions are defined 
mostly by “bonding with place”, a process which takes place over long periods of time. In this 
regional type, the people are the most important distinction – their shared religions, food, 
language, and family traditions.76 These regions, while resembling political unities, are not quite 
the same as the third type of region. In the Political region, it is the actions taken by the people 
which determine the extent of its borders. One might define a political region by looking at 
judicial/legal systems, taxes, currency, and other governmentally ruled pieces of society.77 Reger 
notes all three of these types are interconnected – eventually ending the section saying that “it 
will rarely if ever be possible to draw sharp lines on the ground” to indicate these borders. They 
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are constantly changing, shifting, and moving.78 Oliver likewise states that “geographical and 
political boundaries can be punctuated and transgressed, necessarily so if we are to trace the 
movement of commodities. Nor should interests in the economy operate only at the level of the 
polis or kingdom.”79  
Using a regional approach, as I will apply to the study of Crete, enables us to better 
understand how kingdoms and individual polities interact, particularly from an economic 
standpoint. Theories of who is politically most likely to trade with another region, which regions 
are closest in terms of cost of travel, which regions have beneficial resources to trade, and other 
such markers of economic movement are useful tools to examine the dynamics of the Hellenistic 
Aegean. “If one is to understand economic processes in diverse Hellenistic worlds,” Graham 
wrote, “then one must be aware of the complex variety of micro-regions which make up such 
worlds.”80 It is with this in mind that the basis for an understanding of economics in the 
Hellenistic Aegean can be attained. 
Economics 
Studying the economics of the Hellenistic Aegean can provide information about cultural 
specifics, such as types of imports, exports, trade relations, and about what people considered to 
be valuable. Furthermore, this time period challenges ancient economists to think more broadly 
and more in depth about how to analyze material evidence in terms of economics. Zofia 
Archibald highlights this in the opening chapter of Making, Moving, and Managing, wherein she 
says that “. . . this is the period in which significant changes occurred at macro and micro levels, 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 378. 
79 Oliver, “Regions and Micro-regions,” 141. 
80 Ibid., 153. 
Cummings 23 
 
which allow us to study the interplay of local, regional, and inter-regional connections.”81 It is 
through all of the evidence that has been explained above that regionalism can be applied to 
ancient economic theory. However, there is some debate as to what ancient economies looked 
like and how they should be interpreted. There are two schools of thought on this topic – 
traditional and dynamic.82  
The traditional view is the most prevalent when discussing ancient Greek economics. The 
main premise is that Greece still put merit in a status-distributive (or Homeric) type of profit 
gain, rather than a market economy.83 According to this school of thought, it was ‘immoral’ on 
an individual level to pursue a profession focused on obtaining wealth through production, but 
instead one should build a wealth base on his natural environment or opportunistic ‘homeric’ 
warfare. 84 Furthermore, this view names Greek economics as ‘primitive’, since there is no 
forward thought towards increasing production to then increase profit.85 The point, then, of an 
ancient economy was stability. According to Alan Samuel:  
All [Aristotle’s] reasoning is based on the fundamental assumption that stability 
in society is a good, is achievable, and is the basic aim of all political and 
economic arrangements. Thus the designation of self-sufficiency as the chief 
good. It is so because self-sufficiency is the circumstance which will most surely 
produce stability. . . There is certainly no sense at all that the system calls for, or 
that Aristotle has any interest in, what we would call growth or progress.86 
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Green agrees with his view, citing examples of the lack of Hellenistic innovation, and going so 
far as to say that “The prejudice against commerce ran very deep”. 87 This traditional view has 
been held for quite some time, however. In 1973, I. Finley put forth his view on attempting to 
study ancient Greek economics: “. . . they in fact lacked the concept of an ‘economy’, and, a 
fortiori, that they lacked the conceptual elements which together constitute what we call ‘the 
economy’”.88 It was through this distinction then, that authors like Green and Samuel have come 
to the modern conclusion that the economies of ancient times could not be as complex as they 
are today. Rather, these ‘economies’ (if one can call them such, according to Finley) were simply 
byproducts of ancient attempts at subsistence, or stability. While there is merit and perhaps some 
Classical period evidence for such modes of existence, the Hellenistic period seems to demand 
more than this traditional approach.  
 In a direct response to Finley’s viewpoints, John Davies wrote that there has been a 
“continuous undercurrent of determined deconstruction of the Finley model as static, simplistic, 
useless and retrograde”.89 This is the start to understanding the dynamic model – moving past 
Finley’s outdated information and forward with new evidence and thinking. Zofia Archibald 
defines the dynamic economy approach as a reinterpreting of the complex activities that reside 
within ancient economies through the use of non-linear dynamics and ‘Complexity science’.90 
These models can then lead to more thorough research into specific ancient situations where 
complex factors may be working in conjunction to produce economic realities scholars were 
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previously unaware of. The dynamic model is also attempting to be more intersectional, allowing 
for many different kinds of methods to have a say. Davies explains:  
 “The discourse on ancient economies is becoming lively, even ebullient, it knows 
what it does not like, is busy absorbing interpretative concepts drawn from 
adjacent disciplines such as economic anthropology or systems analysis, but does 
not yet know which models will run best on the layouts of the economies of 
antiquity, which are becoming every year more complex and diverse.”91 
 
It is through the lens of the dynamic model that evidence for Hellenistic Aegean economies will 
be presented, as it is much more applicable to this period than the traditional view. With the 
constant flux of the Hellenistic kings, the wave of changing ideals and values, and a new found 
broader world, a traditionalist view leaves much unanswered.  
 With an understanding of the theories on ancient economics, one can continue on to the 
physical evidence that will contextualize the role of economy in the Aegean. Davies provides an 
acceptable starting place to begin the discussion: 
All one can do is to start from human needs and from the effective demand for 
those needs to be satisfied, to trace the flows of goods and services generated by 
that pattern and level of demand, to superimpose them where the main flows and 
main nodes are, (and conversely where the interactions are feeblest), and then – 
and only then – attempt to identify what ambitions, or ideas and attitudes, or 
transaction costs, or fiscal or governmental interventions, impede or help the 
flows.92 
 
 This formula can streamline any economic discussion within the Hellenistic period, and if 
followed, will provide scholars a base upon which to create their arguments. To start from 
human needs, Gabrielsen makes an argument for monopolies as facilitators of commercial 
progress – the needs being trade interests (be it wood products, foodstuffs, etc.). There is some 
debate, however, as to the political struggles of the hegemonic kingdoms were large economic 
drivers, for in many ways these kings created a net loss of life, harvest, and stability. These 
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issues could be interpreted as mainly negative, or as the start of eventual Hellenistic decline. 
Largely connected to the traditional view of economics, Gabrielsen makes an attempt to move 
away from this perspective, along with Archibald and Davies, by stressing the positive economic 
factors of warfare and hegemonic struggle. He makes an argument for the “specific way in which 
states and private economic actors entered into profitable partnerships: the establishment of 
monopolies or monopoly-like arrangements.”93 Gabrielsen notes five different kinds of ancient 
monopolies, though the ‘Natural Monopoly’ was perhaps most easily applicable to the 
Hellenistic kingdoms. Natural Monopolies, based on an overwhelming cost advantage resulting 
from expansion, created systems with constantly moving borders. In conjunction with the 
movement of these borders, different economic interests needed to be protected. A prime 
example is brought up by Gabrielsen when he considers the case of Kallatis, Byzantion, and 
Rhodes in the middle of the 3rd c. BC. Kallatis wanted to create a monopoly through use of its 
neighbor’s resources, wherein Byzantion (a supporter of “free trade”) declared war immediately 
to protect its own interests. Roughly thirty years later, Byzantion had procured its own monopoly 
on fishing and slave industries within the Bosporus straights, controlling all of the fiscal and 
commercial passage through this area. Rhodes, now the naval protector of the Aegean and free 
trade activitist, declared war on Byzantium. This move was an intentional strategy to promote 
Rhodes’ interests as well as the interests of her allies in the north. By removing Byzantion and 
reestablishing free trade, Rhodes continued to hold its position as a supreme economic 
powerhouse of the region.94 These types of power plays happen throughout the Hellenistic 
Aegean, largely influencing other economies throughout the Mediterranean.  
                                                 
93 Gabrielsen, “Profitable Parnerships,” 219. 
94 Ibid.,  223-24 
Cummings 27 
 
 In addition to monopolistic interest, another way to see economic flows in the Aegean is, 
as mentioned above, transport amphorae and ceramic evidence. Essential to daily life throughout 
Greece, ceramics primarily dominate as the utility for which to transport and store foodstuffs.95 
In a case study highlighting archaeological evidence for the argument that agriculture and trade 
were the primary economic activity of Greece, John Lund uses Eastern Sigillata A fine ware to 
more intimately define the variety of ways in which ceramic assemblages can be of use. The 
geographic distribution implications of this fine ware can be applied to other cases, even those of 
transport amphorae – as distributive trade patterns are a broader economic phenomena.96 Lund 
found that Eastern Sigillata A fine ware was a connected market to agriculture. Furthermore, he 
found that its distribution “must have had a considerable economic importance at a local – if not 
regional – level.”97 Such a statement suggests that a thriving ceramic industry will also indicate a 
thriving local economy, and that they are inextricably linked.  
 The Aegean creates these small pockets of regional variance naturally with its many 
islands and seafaring peoples. For trading between islands, the mainland, and the Ionian coast, 
ships were essential. Some of our best information on ships comes from Rhodes, due to its naval 
superiority at the time. Using Rhodes as the focal point for trade routes, Gabrielsen claims it 
would take five days to sail from Byzantion to Rhodes and ten to sail back. From the Black Sea, 
nine and a half days would be needed. Rhodes to Alexandria would take three and half days, 
while it would take four days to sail from Athens to Rhodes.98 Climate was a large factor in these 
sailing times, as was the type of ship which was attempting the journey. Rhodes had some of the 
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best ships at this time period with its large navy and even larger export trade, but even the best 
ships can turn into shipwrecks on the rocky coasts of Greek islands during a terrible winter 
storm.99  Shipwrecks have recently become popular archaeological endeavors, as we now have 
the technology to locate and excavate more of these unfortunate pieces of the past. Amphorae 
from wrecks have been found originating from Rhodes, Samos, Knidos, Chios, Thasos, Paros, 
Kos, Herakleia, Chersonesos, Sinope, Corinth, along with many more amphorae whose origins 
are still unknown.100 This information alone is quite useful, let alone an investigations into their 
contents. Using the evidence that the majority of Hellenistic Mediterranean wrecks found have 
been small, Gibbins makes the claim that tramping – “the speculative and small-scale contractual 
transport of goods along coastal routes, often within an established economic region” – may be 
the main form of maritime commerce.101 If this is the case in the Hellenistic period, this would 
mean that goods may be moving much more frequently, changing hands at every port. 
Developing theories as to where material goods originated from – who was trading with whom – 
could be much more difficult.  
Piracy and Pirates 
 Related to the topic of ships is the topic of those who were at the helm. According to 
Gabrielsen, pirates were central to maritime trade.102 Piracy during this period was defined, 
according to de Souza, as “any form of armed robbery or plundering involving the use of ships” - 
an all-encompassing type of definition.103 Of course, using this definition makes it difficult to tell 
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the distinction between a naval battle and a ‘pirate’ raid – for robbery and plundering are often 
apart of warfare. In fact, this distinction was so fluid that within the ancient literature ‘pirates’ 
were often simply on the opposing side of the narrator. Polybius, for instance, describes the 
Aetolians as pirates - despite the fact that Aetolians would view themselves as honored 
warriors.104.  
Semantics aside, if pirates were depleting resources, killing men, plundering goods, and 
creating chaos, would they not be negatively impacting commerce? There is a convincing 
argument against piracy as an antithesis to economic growth, however, including the point that 
pirates would want to stimulate commerce in order to further their own economic interests.105  It 
seems that pirates stimulated commerce through providing slaves and other goods for the market, 
while also offering a form of employment when other forms were not available. Though the 
Hellenistic period was full of warfare and strife, de Souza makes the claim that pirate activity did 
not escalate during the Hellenistic period. Instead, the frequency at which pirates were used as 
scapegoats to elevate levels of prestige or substantiate claims of naval supremacy increased, 
creating more references to piracy in the literary record.106 Unfortunately, the means to detect the 
physical presence of pirates or their impact remains elusive. “Whatever our literary sources 
might claim, the contribution of piracy to the economy of any place in Antiquity is unknowable,” 
writes de Souza, “because it cannot be detected.”107 With the multitude of literary evidence, 
however, it is clear that pirates played a large part within the mindsets of the Hellenistic period. 
 
                                                 
104 Polybius, 4.6.1, trans. W. R. Paton, (1922-27); Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (Cambridge: 
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CHAPTER 3 
Rhodes: A Case Study 
 Rhodes is an island of approximately 544 square miles, and is located just below modern 
day Turkey in the eastern Aegean (see Map 1). During the Hellenistic period, Rhodes was a 
major economic force in the Aegean: it possessed the best navy in the region and it became very 
wealthy – it reached the height of its power in the 3rd c. BC. Hellenistic Rhodes is comparatively 
well-documented as a polity and, as a result, it has been the focus of scholarly studies of the 
political/economic trends, maritime trade, and piracy in the Aegean. This chapter will discuss the 
political unity of Rhodes, evidence for Rhodes’ commercial contacts (especially its wine trade), 
and lastly, its role as ‘policeman of the seas’ in the 3rd-century Aegean. These specific aspects of 
Hellenistic Rhodes were chosen because they are points of comparison and relation to 
contemporary Crete and by examining them it is hoped they will provide insight into the latter’s 
position in the Aegean during this period.   
 While the political unity of Rhodes and its ability to maintain a wide sphere of political 
influence will be investigated more thoroughly below, ancient historians suggest how the 
Hellenistic polis was perceived in antiquity. Diodorus Siculus states that Rhodes was a state with 
substantial power and was viewed favorably by other Greeks during the 3rd c. BC:  
The city of the Rhodians, which was strong in sea power and was the best 
governed city of the Greeks, was a prize eagerly sought after by the dynasts and 
kings, each of them striving to add her to his alliance. . . In fact she advanced to 
such strength that in behalf of the Greeks she by herself undertook her war against 
the pirates and purged the seas of these evil-doers. . .108 
 
It is worth noting that Diodorus is claiming that Rhodes maintained the best political system at 
this time, especially since there were many other cities with equally excellent systems. Polybius 
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shows Rhodes as an important sometimes-ally of Rome, but also as guarding their independent 
status for reasons of commercial gain:  
For the policy of Rhodes had been so little by sentiment, that although that state 
had from nearly a hundred and forty years taken part in the most glorious and 
finest achievements of the Romans, they had never made an alliance with Rome. 
The reason of their action in this respect should not be ignored. It was this. As 
they wished none of the kings and princes to despair of gaining their help and 
alliance, they did not desire to run in harness with Rome and engage themselves 
by oaths and treaties, but preferred to remain unembarrassed and able to reap 
profit from any quarter.109 
 
Modern scholars tend to take a favorable view of Rhodes by portraying it as a small island 
struggling to maintain its independence in the midst of larger powers. In this vein, Green states 
that “. . . Rhodes, with her benevolent naval aristocracy and her famous maritime laws, 
nevertheless held out against the dominant pattern of Hellenistic kingship, and preserved much 
of the old classical Greek pride and civic intransigence.”110 It is perhaps due to an overreliance 
on such ancient literary sources that this ‘idealized’ image of Hellenistic Rhodes has been 
perpetuated in modern scholarship. Vincent Gabrielsen puts forth a theory on Rhodes’ extremely 
positive image in the historical record, saying that “The Rhodians certainly deserve credit for 
elevating their city-state to such an admirable position. And no less credit is due to them for their 
persistent endeavours to conserve, and even heighten, the image of their country as an 
immaculate polis . . .”111 Gabrielsen cites three examples where the Rhodian image was 
embellished by ancient historians: Polybios’ view on two Rhodian historians, Diodorus Siculus’ 
“eulogy of Rhodian power and prosperity” in his causes of Macedonian aggression, and 
Polybius’ citation of Roman and Rhodian collaboration for “nearly one hundred and forty 
                                                 
109 Polybius, 30.5, trans. W. R. Paton, (1922-27); There is some question here as to the validity of Polybius’ 
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years”.112 Hans-Ulrich Weimer takes this position a step further when he calls ancient accounts 
of Rhodes “political propaganda” that “cannot serve as a reliable guide to the aims and principles 
of Rhodian policy”.113  
Historical Background 
 During the Late Classical period, Rhodes was allied with Sparta from 412-395 BC.114 
From here, Sparta maintained control of Rhodes until it then became a member of the Second 
Athenian Confederacy in 378 BC. It soon rebelled from Athens in the Social War of 357 BC, 
however.115 After a period of brief independence, the Carians dominated Rhodes until 323 BC 
and the death of Alexander.116 It was not until they repulsed Demetrius Poliorketes of the 
Antigonids, however, at the ‘Great Siege’ of Rhodes in 306/305 BC that they had earned their 
independent status.117 From there, Rhodes developed fairly quickly into a major naval power. 
How the island came to be strong enough to repel the Antigonid forces of Demetrius, 
however, is the key to understanding Rhodes’ rise from simply being independent to becoming a 
commercial superpower. Ioannis Papachristodoulou has said that “the study of the regional 
organization of the Rhodian state . . . has an important contribution to make to our understanding 
of what can rightly be called the “Rhodian miracle” of the Hellenistic period.”118 This ‘miracle’ 
was the synoikism of the island’s three largest poleis in 408/7 BC119 - Ialysos, Camiros, and 
                                                 
112 See Gabrielsen, The Naval Aristocracy, 19-25. 
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Lindos - which led to a cohesive unification that allowed Rhodes to build a political framework 
to support its success. The reasons for the synoikism are not known, though there are two main 
theories: Berthold mentions that it may be linked to Athenian raids after Rhodes defected, while 
the Christopher Mee and Ellen Rice postulate more commercial reasons.120 Once unified, it is 
clear that Rhodes was not a democracy. Rather, it has been likened to an aristocracy, or at the 
very least, to having a republic-like structure.121 Rhodes was unified by oligarchs, and the power 
structure after the synoikism was largely influenced by the euergetism of its upper class. 
Arguably, this was a part of the “infrastructure on which Rhodes’ political and economic success 
relied” – as was the case in most Hellenistic societies.122 This meant that Rhodes was dependent 
on its aristocracy and the wealth of its aristocracy. It could not have succeeded without the 
maintenance of aristocratic wealth.  
 For the most part, however, Rhodes attempted to stay politically neutral in wider world. 
This was primarily motivated by economic interests, but also to avoid military confrontation as 
much as possible.123 Such a policy was largely successful until 160 BC, when the Rhodians 
became entangled in Roman policy.124 This general policy of neutrality can be seen in the events 
leading up to the ‘Great Siege’ – wherein Rhodes attempted to avoid supporting the Antigonids 
in a conflict between the Antigonids and Ptolemies. According to Weimer, Rhodes stood nothing 
to gain from an alliance with either side, it did not want to have political ties it could not sever, 
                                                 
120 Richard Berthold, “Fourth Century Rhodes” Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte 29:1 (1980): 34. Berthold 
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and it wanted to firmly hold onto its autonomy.125 Thus, when negotiations and a Rhodian 
attempt at neutrality failed and the Antigonids sent Demetrios Poliorketes to attack Rhodes, their 
resistance became a symbolic stance against hegemonic power.126 After withstanding the siege, 
the Rhodians used the funds from Demetrios’ abandoned siege weaponry to build the Colossus, a 
giant victory monument that would stand to demonstrate Rhodes’ wealth, power, and prestige.127 
Rhodes had gained a reputation as a major power, and such public proclamations as the Colossus 
were crucial to developing its reputation as the defender and liberator of the Aegean islands.  
 This stance of neutrality does not necessarily equate to a lack of desire for hegemonic 
growth. As Sheila Ager has demonstrated, “Rhodes' ambition was not just for peace per se, but 
rather a peace in which she could profitably pursue her own interest.”128 The Rhodians’ 
involvement as mediators in the Byzantium trade wars, the First Macedonian War, the Syrian 
Wars, and the Cretan Wars all have the pretense of peace but end in the promotion of Rhodian 
interests.  
Beginning in the 3rd c. BC, Rhodian hegemonic aims can be seen quite clearly and its 
image as a benefactor in the region should be viewed as propagandistic.129 By the end of the 3rd 
c. BC, Rhodes had the nearby islands of Karpathos, Chalce, Syme, Megiste, Kasos, Nisyros, 
Telos, and Saros within its political domain.130 Although these islands are relatively small and of 
little strategic importance, their incorporation into the Rhodian political sphere are a sign of the 
progress Rhodes had made on its hegemonic aims. Furthermore, from 200-168 BC Rhodes had 
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significant economic power over and political ties within the Cyclades.131 For Rhodes, having 
strategic control in the Cyclades allowed for greater protection of their merchant vessels. Rhodes 
also used finances to protect its interests and to increase its influence in the Aegean. For 
example, the Rhodians loaned 140,000 drachmas to Sinope in order to prevent a siege by 
Mithridates primarily to ensure that Rhodes’ commercial connection to the Black sea was not 
lost.132 Mithridates decided against attacking the city, which with Rhodes’ aid, would have been 
well-equipped to rebuff his efforts.  
The Rhodian Economy 
For a period of about eighty years after the ‘Great Siege,’ we know little about events on 
Rhodes.133 When Rhodes does reappear in ancient literary sources, it seems to have gone through 
a period of swift economic and political growth. Evidence of the power and position of Rhodes 
comes from the accounts of the many kings and poleis that came to their aid after the earthquake 
of 227/8 BC. So much aid was given that Gabrielsen suggests that the Rhodians were 
“determined to capitalize on the catastrophe, managed by means of diplomatic dexterity to 
extract material and financial aid amounting to far and above the extent of the actual damage: in 
this case, disaster became the occasion for improvement”.134 Berthold rightly emphasizes the 
economics of the situation, which was beyond simple the diplomatic “voluntary tribute” to 
Rhodes, in describing the donors: 
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 All these states were involved in the economic activities of Rhodes, and many 
were dependent on it to some extent for imports and the shipping and marketing 
of exports. . . there was probably also a general fear in the international banking 
community of a widespread financial crisis should the Rhodian economy be 
seriously disrupted. There are in fact few more impressive signs of the extent of 
the Rhodian economic influence than the reaction to the earthquake and the 
seeming ease with which the Rhodians elicited the simultaneous support of the 
ever-contentious Hellenistic powers.135 
 
From all of this evidence, it is clear that Rhodes had become an economic powerhouse in 
the Aegean by the second half of the 3rd c. BC. This position was largely the result of its 
involvement in merchant marine which was the largest in the Hellenistic world and, since the 
fourth century, Rhodian products were traded throughout the Mediterranean, particularly wine 
and oil, as well as grain.136 Berthold stresses that the majority of Rhodian trade was done by 
Rhodian merchants, which gave them physical control over their own interests, and allowed their 
profits to skyrocket by avoiding the middlemen.137 
Located at a prime position in the eastern Aegean and with good harbors, Rhodes is well-
situated as a stopping point on north-south routes along the Ionian coast and east-west routes 
from the Near East to the central Mediterranean.138 Rhodes’ excellent location meant that it was 
also able to profit by taxing incoming and outgoing merchants who would use their ports to 
continue on their trade routes. Polybius states that “the harbour-dues in former times were 
farmed for a million drachmae”, and it is approximated that at two percent tax, fifty million 
drachmae in goods must have passed through Rhodes’ harbors.139  
                                                 
135 Berthold, Rhodes, 93. 
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Banking was another important form of profiting from complex trade interactions for 
Rhodes.  Rhodian merchant-moneylenders, private treasurers, and even public moneylending 
entities loaned, donated, and invested money to other merchants and citizens.140 Such an 
emphasis on banking shows an opportunistic mindset, because debt would accrue power for the 
lenders, lenders would invest money back into Rhodes’ interests, and its growth would benefit its 
prestige.  
Archaeological evidence for the Rhodian trade can be found throughout the Aegean. 
Rhodian transport amphorae have been found at almost every major Hellenistic site, especially 
Athens, Delos, and Alexandria.141 Furthermore, perhaps less significant but still related, are finds 
of Rhodian coins all over the Mediterranean in circulation as wide as their transport amphorae.142  
Nicholas Rauh has demonstrated how the distribution and ratios of Rhodian amphorae handles to 
other non-Rhodian amphorae illustrate the flow of goods between Rhodes and other areas.  
Using this method, for instance, he concludes that the Rhodian wine trade dropped significantly, 
though not drastically, at the end of the 2nd c. BC in the Aegean (through evidence of lessened 
Rhodian amphorae ratios to non-Rhodian amphorae) perhaps due to competition from Kos, 
Knidos, and Kaunos.143 We can also tell by amphorae distributions that Alexandria was a huge 
importer of Rhodian wine in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC due to the huge numbers of stamped 
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handles found there (as well as literary evidence144 that plainly substantiates the claim). With 
upwards of 80,000 handles from Rhodes identified in Alexandria, John Lund theorizes that the 
Rhodians and Ptolemies may have been trading wine for grain increasingly throughout the 2nd 
century.145 David Gibbins is highly skeptical of the identifying an upward trend in Rhodian wine 
using only amphorae handles, though that does not mean that Gibbins denies that Rhodes had a 
remarkable “mercantile dominance”.146 This is a case where caution needs to be taken when 
looking at only amphorae stamps, but it is clear that Rhodian products were intensively 
consumed in Egypt and other places in the late 3rd and early 2nd century BC. 
 Despite difficulties in assessing the absolute volume of Rhodian exports, maritime trade 
clearly would not have been so successful without the Rhodian navy. After the decline of the 
Ptolemaic navy in the mid-3rd century, Berthold claims that “[Rhodes was] the only one that 
possessed the capability of rapidly launching a considerable force and manning it with a constant 
supply of highly skilled sailors”.147 They had small ships, skilled citizen sailors, and enough 
financial stability to grow a fleet so powerful that Rhodes would come to be known as the 
‘protector of the Aegean.’ Gabrielsen claims that the powerful aristocracy of Rhodes is behind 
the upkeep of this navy, not only in leading/funding the ships as a trierarchs, but also in 
supplying the manpower to run them.148 Through the hegemonic growth discussed above, the 
Rhodian navy was able to be stationed throughout the Cyclades and Dodecanese, effectively 
allowing them to dispatch ships quickly and with the full amount of force against any threat.149 
The objectives of the Rhodian navy were multifaceted: to protect the island of Rhodes, to protect 
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any citizen maritime trade interests, to lend protection to allies in times of need, and lastly, the 
most intriguing objective – to protect the Aegean from pirates.150  
Rhodes and Piracy 
 Piracy in the Aegean, as mentioned above, was a phenomenon that could cost an 
economic powerhouse like Rhodes quite a bit of money. Stolen goods, lost ships, the death of 
skilled-sailors or merchants, and loss of their reputation as a sea power were at stake for Rhodes 
should piracy undermine their efforts. Even before the ‘Great Siege’ by Demetrios Poliorketes, 
the Rhodians were dedicated to suppressing piracy in any form. They dispatched warships of 
citizen soldiers after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC to escort merchant vessels after rumors 
of pirates at Piraeus, and also used armed merchantmen to defend cargo vessels against pirates 
on their way to Egypt.151 Furthermore, references to the Rhodians fighting with the Tyrrhenians 
– Etruscan pirates who attacked ships along the trade route between Greece and Italy - are found 
in an inscription from Rhodes dated to 305 BC, wherein three Rhodian brothers were killed.152 
The Rhodians also fought Illyrian pirates in 220 BC, according to Polybius.153  Primarily, 
however, Rhodes is known for their defense of the Aegean from Cretan pirates, which will be 
discussed more fully in the next chapter. Keith Fairbank calls the Rhodians the “pirate police of 
the Mediterranean”, though Green notes that they were “in the business of eradicating piracy 
only when it conflicted with official monopolies.”154 Green implies here that Rhodes often used 
the protection of the Aegean against piracy as a means to protect their monopolies and other 
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economic interests – a far cry from an altruistic model that is adopted by ancient historians.155 
Indeed, Rhodes protected merchant vessels from pirates in Piraeus and from the Illyrians, and 
when one analyzes the treaty between Hierapytna and Rhodes after the First Cretan War, it is 
clear that the Rhodians benefited economically from such actions.156 There is also evidence that 
Rhodes  even created a market out of protection against piracy – Gabrielsen states that Rhodes 
“nearly managed to monopolize the protection market by making the supply of phylake 
(‘protection’) to paying customers both a top-ranking objective and the specialty of her fleet.”157 
Indeed, the Rhodian fleet was made to combat the fast and light ships of pirates through its own 
speed and efficiency.158 Berthold tells us that “Shouldering the burden of policing the Aegean, 
though motivated by self-interest, could only enhance Rhodes’ already brilliant reputation among 
the smaller communities . . .”159 And so it did. Of course, being a protector for the good of all 
would have complimented their ongoing personal propaganda, and a display of force and wealth 
could never hurt. 
This prestige allowed the Rhodians to build trust in a variety of smaller entities, and 
historians would remember them throughout time as the wealthiest in the Aegean, best governed 
of the Greeks, protectors of the innocent, and eradicators of pirates. This reputation is crucial to 
understanding literary accounts of the First Cretan War, when there was a general agreement that 
Rhodes should eliminate the ‘Cretan’ pirate threat from the southern Aegean. Arguably Rhodian 
propaganda was so entrenched that no ancient historian would speak ill of such a decision, and 
perhaps as a direct result very few modern historians would either.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Hellenistic Crete 
 With a firm background in the use of literary sources, archaeological evidence, piracy, 
and Rhodes, I will now discuss the evidence for politics, economy and society of Hellenistic 
Crete. First, I will describe the literary sources highlighting Polybius’, Diodorus’, and Strabo’s 
specific views on Crete. Next, a full explanation of the “Cretan Mirage” and Paula Perlman’s 
alternative view on the reasons for the beginning of the First Cretan War will provide the 
necessary introduction to the marginalization of Crete in modern scholarship. Using the evidence 
for the “Cretan Mirage”, an analysis of the archaeological evidence for Cretan commerce will 
follow. A brief history of 3rd and 2nd c. BC Crete, and Cretan pirates, will lead up to a 
comparison of Crete and Rhodes, allowing for the final conclusion: the “Cretan Mirage” 
facilitated a disregard for interpreting Cretan commerce as significant, Crete in the Hellenistic 
period was nearly as economically successful as Rhodes, and its maritime success led to the 
slandering of the island and its people by ancient and modern authors.   
Sources and Evidence for Hellenistic Crete 
 Modern investigations into ancient Crete have focused on the Minoan period of the island 
(2000-1500 BC), a time period that has captured the mind of scholars for over a century with its 
massive palaces. As the island moved from prehistory to history, one might expect our 
knowledge of Crete to increase, but this is largely not the case.160 For the Hellenistic period, the 
best documented pre-Roman era, our main literary sources are Polybius, Diodorus, and Strabo, 
who offer intriguing snippets about Cretan mercenaries, the general war torn nature of the island, 
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or moments when Cretan generals provided aid to larger military ventures. While these 
references are somewhat helpful, they tend to be colored by the author’s particular bias, and so 
scholars must rely on other means in order to gain information on this island (see below).  
 When analyzing these sources for Hellenistic Crete, there are two crucial points to keep 
in mind. First, the literary sources are not Cretan. This means we are subjected to an outsider’s 
perspective in all the cases for literary accounts of Hellenistic Cretan history. Second, arguably, 
the island of Crete had been on the fringes of the Greek civilization since the end of the Late 
Bronze Age. Not quite integrated into mainland Greece due to its distance (approximately 187 
nautical miles from central Crete to Athens) and too big to be apart of the Cyclades, Crete seems 
to have occupied a liminal space for most ancient Greeks. Thus, while Cretans were 
acknowledged as Greeks, they were seen as slightly outside the ancient Greek norm.  
The earliest source we have for Hellenistic Crete is book 4 of Polybius’ Histories.161 
While discussing the differences in the character of men during battle, he states that: “the Cretans 
both by land and sea are irresistible in ambuscades, forays, tricks played on the enemy, night 
attacks, and all petty operations which require fraud, but they are cowardly and down-hearted in 
the massed face-to-face charge of an open battle. It is just the reverse with the Achaeans and 
Macedonians.”162 This is only the first of many one or two line appearances of Cretans in 
Polybius, but already there is an obvious tone of disapproval. In other ways, however, this image 
is slightly terrifying. One can imagine Cretans as guerilla fighters, using their “tricks” and 
“fraud” to catch the unsuspecting by surprise. Either way, this is no positive account of Cretan 
war tactics. Either they are cowardly or frightening – neither can bode well. Later, while 
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comparing the constitutions of different entities to Rome’s, in the most commonly cited excerpt 
by modern scholars, Polybius states:  
Their laws go as far as possible in letting [the Cretans] acquire land to the extent 
of their power, as the saying is, and money is held in such high honour among 
them that its acquisition is not only regarded as necessary, but as most 
honourable. So much in fact do sordid love of gain and lust for wealth prevail 
among them, that the Cretans are the only people in the world in whose eyes no 
gain is disgraceful.. . . owing to their ingrained lust of wealth they are involved in 
constant broils both public and private, and in murders and civil wars, they regard 
this as immaterial. . .163 
 
This version of the typical Cretan is quite blatant in its bias. Such mercantile behavior was held 
as uncivilized because of the ancient Aristotelian view on economics – wherein possession or 
acquisition of material wealth not stemming from private landownership was a sign of immoral 
character or a similar disconnection from ideals of Greek ethnicity.164 Most scholars agree that 
the motivation for Polybius’ bias was contemporary relations between Crete and Aetolia, the 
latter were the archenemies of the Achaeans.165  Crete was known to have dealings with the 
Aetolians and as a proud Achaean, Polybius’ had plenty of reason to slander the Cretans.  He 
may have even been using a Rhodian source for his sections on Crete, which would also shed 
light on his bias, as Rhodes and Crete were at war twice in the Hellenistic period.166 In doing so, 
Polybius creates a universal image of the ‘bad’ Cretan – one that is difficult to believe. Crete, 
dotted by one-hundred poleis from the Archaic to Hellenistic periods167 and geographically 
                                                 
163 Polybius, Histories, 6.46, trans. W. R. Paton, (1922-27). 
164 Refer back to Chapter 2, on economic theory, page 22. 
165 Stylianos Spyridakis, Ptolemaic Itanos and Hellenistic Crete (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 
40. Spyridakis also mentions Cretans allying with Nabis of Sparta (Polybius, Histories, 13.8). Nabis was a tyrant 
whom the literary sources tell us was brutal to the extreme, and even if this is an exaggeration, he nonetheless began 
to attack Messene (Sparta’s long-time ally) and attempt to take control of the Peloponnese.  Any Achaean would 
find this character notorious. See also Polybius’ personal background in Chapter 2 on literary sources, page 10. 
166 Perlman, “The Marginalization of Crete,” 133; See also the “Cretan Mirage” section below, page 49. 
167 See Paula Perlman, “Crete” in An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by the 
Copehagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
1144. 
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separated by mountain ranges, would inherently develop a multitude of cultural difference 
between regions (see Map 2).168Susan Alcock notes that “The uneven physical topography and 
irregular shape of the island also contributed to the delineation of certain natural divisions and 
zones.”169  
 
Map 2: Elevation map of Crete. 
The fact that they were “engaged in . . . civil wars” most likely had something to do with 
their regional differences.  As we have no idea of the scope and duration of these ‘civil wars’, 
aside from a few epigraphic references, this situation is not uniquely Cretan in the Hellenistic 
period. Although Polybius’ statement on wars in Crete is likely an exaggeration, Hellenistic 
Greece was full of similar events. One may only look upon events such the mass government 
                                                 
168 Reger, “Inter-Regional Economies,” 373-74. A more in-depth discussion of how Crete displays these regional 
differences can be found in the Cretan Politics section below, page 59-60. 
169 Susan Alcock, “Three ‘R’s’ of the Cretan Economy,” in From Minoan Farmers to Roman Traders, ed. Angelos 
Chaniotis (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999), 177. 
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reform and murder of previous rulers after the death of Antigonus Doson in the Peloponnese in 
221 BC for prime examples. 170  
 Diodorus Siculus provides a similar description of Cretans when they attacked Siphnos:  
The Cretans, putting in at Siphnos, assaulted the city and by intimidation and 
deceit gained admission within the walls. Having pledged their word to commit 
no wrong, but acting with customary Cretan faithlessness, they enslaved the city, 
and after sacking the temples of the gods (set sail) for Crete, laden with their 
spoil. Swiftly the gods inflicted upon them the penalty for their transgressions, 
and the divine power signally dealt with their impiety in unexpected fashion. . . 171 
 
According to Diodorus, Cretans are “faithless”, and impious.172 Thus, when they are destroyed in 
the night by a gale that ripped their ships apart, it is only the justice of the gods. Any narrative of 
war is interesting in terms of demonizing the opponent and then rejoicing in their failures – here, 
even more interesting is how the Cretans used “intimidation and deceit” to gain entrance to the 
city. From a victor’s point of view, perhaps if a Cretan had told this story, they may have utilized 
“clever” or “resourceful” ways to enter this city, or would have been called “brave” or “fierce” in 
terms of their entrance. It is the consistent use of such negative language to describe the actions 
of Cretans during the Hellenistic period by ancient historians that created the “Cretan Mirage.”173 
 Strabo also participates in this demonization of Cretans when he discusses Crete in the 
tenth book of his Geography.174 Although he was not as anti-Cretan in his discourse as Polybius 
                                                 
170 See Green, Alexander to Actium, Chapter 18 “Antiochus III, Philip V, and The Roman Factor, 221-196 [BC]”, 
286-311. This chapter illustrates the civil war, murder, and political upheaval of the middle of the Hellenistic period 
in Greece. 
171 Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 31.45, trans. Francis Walton (1957); See also Chapter 2 on Diodorus 
Sicululs in literary sources, page 12. 
172 Diodorus also mentions Crete in a negative light in 18.20, and 27.3; See Chapter 2 on literary sources and 
Diodorus Siculus, page 12. Diodorus was influenced heavily by his sources, and Polybius particularly. 
173 See Perlman, “The Marginalization of Crete,” 137-38. 
174 See Chapter 2 on Strabo in literary sources, page 13. 
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and Diodorus, perhaps due to his greater distance in time and space, or perhaps due to his focus 
on cultural and regional distinctions within his work175, he says that:  
In regard to Crete, writers agree that in ancient times it had good laws, and 
rendered the best of the Greeks its emulators, and in particular the 
Lacedaemonians176 . . . But later it changed very much for the worse; for after the 
Tyrrhenians, who more than any other people ravaged Our Sea, the Cretans 
succeeded to the business of piracy; their piracy was later destroyed by the 
Cilicians; but all piracy was broken up by the Romans . . .177 
  
Therefore, even from a less bias source it was known that Crete “changed very much for the 
worse” and that they were committed to piracy in the minds of Greeks.178 Aside from Strabo’s 
commentary on this historical change, most of his account consists of descriptions of individual 
Cretan cities, their constitutions, and their societies. The way in which Strabo takes the time to 
individually describe Knossos, Gortyn, and Kydonia exemplifies the very idea that these poleis 
were distinct. He even says “Of these peoples, according to Staphylus, the Dorians occupy the 
part towards the east, the Kydonians the western part, the Eteo-Cretans the southern; and to these 
last belongs the town Prasus, where is the temple of the Diktaean Zeus; whereas the other 
peoples, since they were more powerful, dwelt in the plains.”179 Strabo seems to be highlighting 
a regional concept of Crete – at least their distinct polities, if not their cultural differences.180 The 
warfare between the Cretans may have more to do with this, perhaps, than their “ingrained 
avarice” in Polybius’ account.  
                                                 
175 See the discussion on Strabo’s personal background and focus for the Geography in Chapter 2, page 13. One 
might argue that highlighting regional differences facilitates stereotypes, though here Strabo seems to avoid too 
much blatant negativity.  
176 Lacedaemonians were from Lacadaemonia, the region under the direct control of Sparta. Sparta, according to 
Strabo, used laws of the Cretans in the Archaic period, as Cretans were famous as lawgivers in that period. 
177 Strabo, Geography, 10.9. trans. H. L. Jones (1917). 
178 Strabo was probably using Diodorus and Polybius as source material here, and his description of Cretan pirates is 
very similar. This shows the strength and enduring nature of the Cretan pirate stereotype. 
179 Ibid., 10.6, trans. H. L. Jones (1917). 
180 Refer back to regionalism in Chapter 2, page 20. 
Cummings 47 
 
 Epigraphic evidence is in many ways more informative about Cretan society, as they are 
from Crete, than ancient historical accounts. It provides arguably more ‘neutral’ evidence and is 
much more plentiful, in the form of treaties, honorary degrees, and oaths. In particular, the Itanos 
Oath and an Honorary Decree from Athens to Eumaridas in Crete describe Crete’s interactions 
with other poleis, its economic prosperity, and its broader reputation.181 The Itanos Oath provides 
an excellent example of the aims of the oligarchical government of Itanos on Crete, and their 
expectations of their citizens.182  It says: “I will [not] betray [any] of the citizens / nor any of the 
belongings of the citizens. [And] I will not provoke an assembly or [conspiracy] for the harm of 
[the city] or of the citizens, nor will I associate with anyone [else] who / [wishes] to do any of 
these things . . .”183 According to Michael Austin, this oath was needed in Itanos at a time when 
the body of citizens was growing in the 3rd century, and it acted as a safeguard against new 
citizen uprisings.184 Itanos is located at the most eastern point on Crete (see Map 3), an area from 
which we have quite a bit of commercial evidence.185 These types of citizen oaths are not 
uncommon on Crete. Another example of a citizen oath can be found at Dreros, though instead 
of peace between citizens, it encourages conflict between two communities.186 In some ways, 
however, Spyridakis found that the Dreros oath, which pitted Drerians against Lyttans, is “less 
diabolical” than some Athenian oaths against Thebans, which delineates specific violent means 
to be taken against the enemy.187 Unlike Polybius’ perception of Crete, it would seem that 
governments are attempting to moderate conflict between cities – just like any other Greek city.  
                                                 
181 William Dittenberger, ed. Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum (Syll.), “Itanos (Crete): oath of loyalty to the state 
(third century),” 526; Austin, The Hellenistic World, Inscription 108, 206-07; Dittenberger, ed. Syll., “Oath of 
Dreros in Crete (c.220?),” 527; Austin, The Hellenistic World, Inscription 109, 207-08. 
182 Dittenberger, ed. Syll., “Itanos (Crete): oath of loyalty to the state (third century),” 526. 
183 Ibid., 
184 Austin, The Hellenistic World, 207. 
185 See below section on Cretan commerce, page 52. 
186 Dittenberger, ed. Syll., “Oath of Dreros in Crete (c. 220?),” 527, lines 1-136. 
187 Spyridakis, Ptolemaic Itanos,41. 
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 Another decree from Athens dated 217/16 BC honors the Cretan Eumaridas of Kydonia: 
Since Eumaridas both previously, / and at the time when Bucris overran the 
countryside and carried off to Crete a large number of the citizens and of the 
others from the city, performed many great services for the people and 
contributed money from his own pocket. . . and (since) he undertakes to show 
every care to ensure the preservation of good relations between the people (of  
Athens) / and all the inhabitants of Crete; . . . be it resolved by the people, to 
praise Eumaridas son of Pancles of Cydonia, and to crown him with a gold crown 
according to the law because of his goodwill.188 
 
It is clear that there were good relations between Eumaridas and Athens, if not also between 
Athens and Kydonia (see Map 1 and 3).189 de Souza notes that Bucris may be Aitolian, and 
Aitolians and Cretans are known to have contact during this time – and thus “it is no surprise to 
find the Athenian captives being disposed of in Crete.”190 It may be that Eumaridas is being 
bought-off in the tradition of Hellenistic euergetes, but positive relations between Athens and 
Cydonia are documented in the late 4th century BC, lessening the probability that such an 
arrangement is being made.191 Even more surprising, however, in comparison to the image of 
Cretans as pirates given by ancient sources, is that a Cretan has rescued victims of pirates instead 
of being a pirate himself. This inscription suggests that not all interactions between Cretans and 
other Greeks were negative, and that that Polybius, Diodorus, and to some extent, Strabo, are 
presenting a stereotype rather than a reality.    
The “Cretan Mirage” and the First Cretan War 
The “Cretan Mirage” is the idea that Hellenistic Crete is represented in both ancient 
literature and modern scholarship as piratical, uncivilized, greedy, war-torn, immoral and full of 
                                                 
188 Dittenberger, ed. Syll., “Athens honours Eumaridas of Cydonia in Crete for rescuing victims of Aetolian pirates 
(217/16),” 535. 
189 Perhaps Athens even had good relations with more than one Cretan or city during this period as hinted at by the 
use of the word “preservation” (διαμένειν). 
190 de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, 67. 
191 Ibid., 67, fn. 93. There is another inscription honoring Eurylochos of Kydonia for ransoming Athenian prisoners, 
similar to Eumaridas in 320 BC.  
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liars and thieves. This image nurtured by Polybius and perpetuated by anyone who used him as a 
source. For instance, the “Cretan Mirage” has influenced modern scholars to the point that some 
have attempted to use Polybius and his successor ancient historians to interpret various new 
kinds of evidence about Hellenistic Crete, which leads very problematic results (see below).192 
One of the largest perpetuations of this mirage involves the First Cretan War between Rhodes 
and Crete in 205 BC.  
The First Cretan War is traditionally presented as a response to a Cretan pirate attack on 
various Aegean islands, resulting in Rhodes declaring war on the inhabitants of Crete. Diodorus 
Siculus states that it began in this way: “With a fleet of seven ships the Cretans began to engage 
in piracy, and plundered a number of vessels. This had a disheartening effect upon those who 
were engaged in commerce by sea, whereupon the Rhodians, reflecting that this lawlessness 
would affect them also, declared war upon the Cretans”.193 Modern scholarship continued to see 
Crete at fault in this situation, though Paula Perlman presents an alternative view. In her article, 
“The Marginalization of Crete in Greek Thought and the Role of Piracy in the Outbreak of the 
First Cretan War”, Perlman states the following: 
Diodorus’ account of the outbreak of the First Cretan War probably depends upon 
Polybius, who in turn relied upon a Rhodian source or sources, most importantly 
Zeno’s history. To be sure, Polybius criticized Zeno and his fellow Rhodian 
Antisthenes, for their patriotic exaggeration, but it is unlikely that Polybius, 
whose hatred for the Cretans is evident throughout his history, would have 
scrutinized his Rhodian sources for an anti-Cretan bias.194 
 
She argues convincingly that the reason for First Cretan War was not piracy, but rather was 
economically driven. Perlman’s argument is a complex one that utilizes a variety of evidence and 
                                                 
192 See the below section on Pirates and Hadjidaki, “Preliminary Report of Excavations at the Harbor of Phalasarna 
in West Crete” American Journal of Archaeology 92:4(1988): 463. 
193 Diodorus Siculus, Historical Library, 27.3, trans. Francis Walton (1957). 
194 Perlman, “The Marginalization of Crete,” 133. 
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is highly critical of ancient authors’ account of Hellenistic Crete. She begins with the argument 
that there are no good sources that tell us about the end of the First Cretan War, and therefore we 
have no concrete evidence of how Rhodes actually defeated Crete.195 The only source for the end 
of the war is possibly the treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna – where it is clear that Rhodes 
maintained a dominant position in the negotiations.196 It provides for the deployment of 
Hierapytnian mercenaries and/or armies when Rhodes demanded, the suppression of piracy 
whenever Hierapytna saw it, as well as the use of the Cretan city’s harbor and navy bases.197 
Such an alliance is very beneficial to a power such as Rhodes, and quite limiting to Hierapytna’s 
pursuit of its own interests. This, however, is not concrete evidence for Rhodes’ victory. 
Perlman’s next point is that Crete has been traditionally viewed by ancient Greeks as a “distant 
and remote place” where Cretans are “morally ill-equipped to fight as hoplites”, and when they 
do fight it is “devious and underhanded”.198 She then goes on to explain that previously, piracy 
on Crete was used to explain new settlement patterns from the Classical period to the Hellenistic 
period, where the Classical period displayed isolated poleis in the uplands, and the Hellenistic 
period displayed a movement towards the coastal regions with much more interaction with other 
poleis as a result of more people becoming pirates and needing the harbors.199 She argues then 
that piracy was not a good explanation of this development – rather, it was increased material 
prosperity related to trade and commercial activities that led to population growth and the desire 
to occupy coastal areas. Furthermore, inscriptions provide solid evidence for Crete’s 
involvement maritime trade on a much larger scale than previously recognized, which may be 
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one source of the prosperity that led to the new settlement patterns.200 These inscriptions are 
treaties and tax agreements between poleis, which, among other incentives, provide for the 
facilitation of goods through isopoliteia, or multiple citizenship rights.201 Finally, she argues that 
Rhodes was a maritime power with the boldness to attack in order to protect their economic 
assets – as happened with Byzantion – and they had a bold propaganda strategy to back up their 
reasoning for attacking anyone who stood to threaten their hold on them.202 Part of Perlman’s 
argument is that instead of viewing Cretans as pirates, one should accept that Crete had 
“legitimate maritime interests and probably upon occasion legitimate reasons to appeal to force 
in support of those interests. The reputation of the Cretans may be in part attributable to their 
conceptual marginalization, and the ancient tradition concerning Cretan piracy should be 
considered in that light.”203 
These points together compel a new picture of the First Cretan war, wherein Crete is no 
longer a threat through piracy to Rhodes, but rather Crete becomes a threat to Rhodes through 
their commerce. Perlman pushes us to question our sources, reevaluate the evidence that has 
been provided, and look for new evidence as it arises. She writes that “it is hoped that this 
exercise will serve to . . . shed some light both on the role of ethnic stereotyping in Greek 
historiography and on Rhodian commercial interests and policy.”204 Her analysis of the First 
Cretan War opens the door to analyze Crete more broadly, not just in regard to the First Cretan 
War, but also in terms of the Hellenistic Aegean.  
                                                 
200 Ibid., 145. 
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 Trusting Polybius as a contemporary source on Hellenistic Crete is an understandably 
strong desire among modern historians. Yet, as Perlman has shown, it is harmful to our overall 
understanding of the Hellenistic period, and especially to Crete. The “Cretan Mirage” colors the 
limited non-literary evidence easily, encouraging modern historians and archaeologists to read 
new evidence with an old mindset, instead of interpreting it with fresh eyes. Furthermore, one 
cannot argue against a contemporary historical source – one can, however, be critical of the 
account and attempt to identify bias within it by comparing the information with other available 
evidence. For instance, Cretans most assuredly had a large mercenary force, and piracy was 
definitely committed by some Cretans, but the frequency of such activities and the proportion of 
the population they involved, must be challenged. Only when the “Cretan Mirage” is recognized 
can new evidence can translate into new theories, which can then change the view of Hellenistic 
Crete.  
Evidence for Cretan Commerce in the Hellenistic Period 
In 1999, Angelos Chaniotis stated that “With the exception of timber, there is no 
evidence for substantial export of any products of the economy of the uplands – or of Crete, for 
that matter – before the Imperial period.”205 Such was the scholarly opinion on Cretan commerce 
in the Hellenistic period only 15 years ago. While he notes that trade activity increased during 
the Hellenistic period on Crete, he cites a lack of evidence “for a long-distance trade with local 
products, for local manufacture, for Cretan merchants, and – more important – for the display of 
private wealth which characterizes big and small Hellenistic poleis.”206 In making this argument, 
he uses primarily inscriptions and literary sources, the continuity of subsistence economies, and 
some Cretan treaties to discuss economic trends in Crete from the Archaic through Hellenistic 
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periods. Notably lacking, however, in the corpus of Chaniotis’ work on Cretan economies are 
references to archaeological evidence. While his overall conclusion that the economy of pre-
Roman Crete is characterized by subsistence farming is likely, the addition of archaeological 
data provides a much broader picture. 
First, there is considerable data for the economy in the Hellenistic period from finds of 
Cretan ceramics as objects of trade.  In an analysis of the East Cretan wine trade, Natalia 
Vogeikoff-Brogan and Stavroula Apostolakou investigated the ceramic assemblages of Mochlos, 
Pyrgos Myrtos, Trypetos, and Agios Nikolaos (see Map 3). Through the use of petrographic 
analysis, they found three local types of transport amphorae, all of which are made of a fabric 
they coined East Cretan Cream Ware (ECCW).207 They found, in fact, “substantial evidence of a 
significant production of local transport amphoras in East Crete from the third century BC.” This 
indicates that this region during the Hellenistic period was producing enough surplus wine or oil 
to justify making vessels to export it. Furthermore, ECCW amphorae have been found in 
Egypt.208 With a production center and a distribution destination, the evidence is growing for 
East Crete as a larger economic force than has been recognized. These sites, especially Trypetos, 
also produced finds of non-local imported amphorae209- from Rhodes, Cos, Knidos, and Corinth 
- all suggesting a larger scale of commercial importation than is previously acknowledged.  
There is another form of Cretan ceramic that has been found in Egypt, called the Hadra 
Hydria.210 There are two distinct forms: White Ground Hydriae, and Clay Ground Hydriae.211 
While the White Ground variety has been found only in Egypt, the Clay Ground type is found all 
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210 Philip Callaghan and R. E. Jones, “Hadra Hydriae and Central Crete: A Fabric Analysis” The Annual of the 
British School at Athens 80 (1985): 2. 
211 Ibid., 1-2. 
Cummings 54 
 
over the Mediterranean, including from Alexandria to Crete, Rhodes, Cyprus, Athens, Eretria, 
South Russia, Turkey, Cyrenaica, Italy, and Thera.212 .213 Such a distribution indicates a far 
greater level of contact between local production and larger networks of exchange than a 
primarily agrarian-based economy or piracy would otherwise have allowed.214  
In his only reference to material culture, Chaniotis minimizes the role of Hadra Hydriae 
saying that “The importance of the export of Cretan ‘Hadra vases’ to the islands’ economy 
should not be overestimated.”215 He and others argue that mercenaries brought the Clay Ground 
vases with them to Egypt as personal possessions.216 While there were many Cretan mercenaries 
stationed throughout the Hellenistic world, the idea that there is only a “second-hand market” in 
Hadra Hydriae, especially the Clay Ground type, is quite unlikely. If this were the case, then 
their ubiquity and distribution would be dependent upon each mercenary group carrying a 
multitude of Hadra Hydriae with them, and then selling them or redistributing them when they 
arrived at different ports. Furthermore, even if a mercenary were to bring items with him while 
participating in warfare, it is unlikely that the quite large and cumbersome Hadra Hydriae would 
be a part of his personal cargo (see Fig. 1).217 
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Fig. 1: Two Hadra Hydria. The Hadra on the left stands at 36.7cm in height and 24.9cm in width, while 
the Hadra on the right stands at 46.7cm in height and 26.1cm in width. 
 
One justification of the mercenary-distribution argument is that the vessels were used as 
prizes, similar to those used in the Panathenaic games, and that they may have been re-used later 
as burial urns.218 Peter Callaghan states that “No Clay Ground hydria . . . bore specifically 
funerary scenes on its surface and thus there is no proof that they were ever primarily intended 
for the use to which they were ultimately put.”219 Although this is true, this argument can easily 
be flipped to state that there is no evidence that only vases marked with funerary scenes were 
intended to be used as funerary urns (and, in fact, there is lots of evidence to the contrary). While 
it is easy to assume that mercenaries brought some goods with them around the Mediterranean, 
there is no direct evidence that these vases arrived at their final destinations via mercenaries. 
What would such evidence even look like within the archaeological record? A far better 
explanation for the distribution pattern of Clay Ground Hadra Hydriae removes mercenaries 
from the picture and instead credits Crete with an economy like any other region of the 
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Mediterranean that produced a ceramic vessel that was widely traded. It is the ‘Cretan mirage’ 
and the more plausible theory of the White Ground Hydriae that resulted in the somewhat far-
fetched assumption that mercenaries were the engines of trade in these Cretan products during 
the Hellenistic period. 
Numismatic evidence is a largely untapped resource for determining the extent of the 
Hellenistic Cretan economy. Coin evidence shows a large increase in the amount of Cretan coins 
during the 3rd century BC being produced at Kydonia, Gortyn, Phaistos, Knossos, and Lyttos 
(see Map 3).220 According to Manolis Stefanakis, the evidence suggests that Cretan coins only 
circulated outside of Crete during the Hellenistic period.221 Coins from Crete have been found at 
Delos, Kythera, and at the Athenian Agora (see Map 3).222 In the 320s B.C., Cretans opened their 
mints and began to overstrike coins - primarily Aiginetan staters.223 They appear to have 
operated on a “reduced Aiginetan standard” in order to “cover the 5% cost of melting and 
restriking.”224 At around this time, a decree from Gortyn was released, stating that “one must use 
the bronze coinage which the city has issued; one must not accept the / silver obols. If anyone 
accepts (the silver obols) or refuses to accept the (bronze) coinage or sells anything in exchange 
for grain, he shall be fined five silver staters.”225 This decree implies both that there was 
significant commerce occurring to issue such a statement and that a polis might regulate coinage 
used in local markets. Through the use of the Aeginitan standard and the discovery of Cretan 
coins outside of Crete, it seems that Crete is engaging in large trade networks. It is unclear 
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exactly what was being traded, the quantity of the items being exchanged, and how these items 
may have reached their find spots, however. As Reger states in his discussion on regionalism and 
trade, common currencies are indicators and represent a “candidate for a region” that may be a 
trade partner.226 
  
Map 3: Crete with significant archaeological sites. 
 Stefanakis, attributes this “outburst” of coin circulation with “returning mercenaries, 
commerce, or military disturbances in the Aegean”.227 It could also, however, be due to new 
commercial enterprises, a larger scale of production, or many other factors not related to piracy 
and/or mercenary profit as the driving forces the Hellenistic Cretan economy. This is not to deny 
that mercenary work may have been an economic motivator for some aspects of Cretan society, 
but rather that it is likely that there were more factors at play. An example of how Hellenistic 
economies worked at a local level can be seen in the archaeological data from the site of 
Trypetos. Located in east Crete near Itanos, it was an autonomous polis issuing her own coinage 
from the 3rd to mid-2nd c. B.C went it was destroyed (see Map 3).228  
                                                 
226 Reger, “Interregional Economies,” 386. 
227 Ibid., 259. 
228 Natalia Vogeikoff-Brogan, “Domestic Assemblages from Trypitos, Siteia: Private and Communal Aspects,” in 
STEGA: The Archaeology of Houses and Households in Ancient Crete, ed. Kevin Glowacki and Natalia Vogeikoff-
Brogan (Athens: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2011), 411; Westgate, “House and Society,” 
432. 
Trypetos 
Cummings 58 
 
The excavation was primarily directed at studying domestic organization and attempting 
to discern the social and political organization of cities in Hellenistic Crete.229 It was found that 
in a sample of three housing spaces, two contained oblong houses with a “low value of 
openness”, while the third, Cluster E, had a “high value of openness” and this one had 
accessibility to the street.230 Artifacts found in this last cluster, including a stone perirrhanterion 
(wash basin), a lekane (ceramic basin), a stone gourna, stone tools, loomweights, and pithoi 
(storage jars), as well as its accessibility and openness, resulted in the interpretation of Cluster E 
as having a commercial function.231 Using petrographic analysis, it was found that either at 
Trypetos or in the immediate vicinity, there was a site associated with wine production.232 Along 
with examples of a possible Trypetos type of amphora, there were also Hierapytnian, Coan, 
Rhodian, and Corinthian amphorae found in Cluster E – and all of these samples date to 
approximately the late 3rd or early 2nd c. B.C. 233  Across the Street in Building C, there was an 
olive press signaling the local production of olive oil. These finds combined other similar 
archaeological data from Trypetos to provide evidence of daily economic activity that is typical 
of most Hellenistic towns (e.g., Halieis in the Argolid). The local production of a Trypetos 
transport amphora is clear evidence on the part of the city to engage with intra-regional trade 
networks. The town was clearly connected to local and Aegean maritime trading routes as shown 
by the Hierapteran amphorae and the amphorae from Cos, Rhodes, and Corinth.  Such small-
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scale production as the wine amphora of Trypetos may also provide a better understanding of 
Cretan commerce, which was clearly not restricted to the uplands agrarian model which 
Chaniotis claims for Crete nor to piracy.  
The archaeological evidence from Crete clearly illustrates larger scale inter-regional 
commerce than has been previously acknowledged by scholars. The ceramic evidence of ECCW 
and Hadra Hydria, the numismatic evidence of a larger output of Cretan coinage and its 
circulation beyond the island in the Hellenistic period, and the site of Trypetos all hint at, if not 
confirm, the island- wide variation of commercial activity. Crete, and particularly eastern Crete, 
maintained a thriving economy that participated in and influenced the exportation of various 
goods across the Greek world. This commercial activity was diverse in its material goods as well 
as in its various maritime trade networking agents – both intra-regional and inter-regional. The 
impact, while unnoticed by most modern scholars, would not have been unnoticed by ancient 
merchants. 
(Dis)Unity: A Brief Note on Cretan Politics  
After 323 BC, when Alexander the Great died, Crete was largely ignored by his 
successors.234 Although our sources are fairly limited on Hellenistic Crete, we can reconstruct a 
basic history up to the Roman conquest. After Alexander’s death, the next major recorded 
historical event was the First Cretan War, when Rhodes and Crete were at war in 205-201 BC.235 
Rhodes, the pirate police force of the Aegean, the protectors of the innocent, the strong and able 
maritime power, declared war on Crete on the grounds that seven Cretan ships were “engaging in 
acts of piracy” and plundering “no small number of vessels.”236 According to Diodorus, “the 
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Rhodians made war on the Cretans recognizing that it was only a matter of time before the 
Cretans harmed them.”237 Such an act looks to be preemptive, and because Rhodes’ stance on 
piracy was strict, it could be seen as a chance to prove their naval superiority while gaining 
popularity throughout the Aegean for quelling pirates.238 This war ended with a treaty between 
Hierapytna and Rhodes.239 This was the first of two Cretan wars with Rhodes. The second Cretan 
war lasted from 155-153 BC, also fought over issues of piracy.240  
 Crete’s documented external relations during the Hellenistic period include profitable 
relations with Egypt, Athens, Aigina, the Peloponnese, and even Rhodes, many of which began 
in the Classical period.241 Ptolemaic relations were especially prevalent, because having a 
foothold in Crete, military or economic, would be crucial to relations with the rest of the Greek 
world. As Spyridakis explains, “The Hellenistic despots of the East, ruling over multitudes of 
non-Greek subjects, were vitally interested in securing the services of Greek colonists, 
administrators, and soldiers for the consolidation of their power. . .”242 Relations with Rome 
began in 189 BC, when it was arbitrating between the Cretan cities of Kydonia, Gortyn and 
Knossos.  Even if it was not an explicitly commercial relationship, Rome interacted with Crete in 
the role of a neutral mediator in order to maintain peace in the region.243 The archaeological 
evidence does not support piracy as an enormous sector of Cretan commerce. If they had a 
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successful maritime trade network, however, this may have accounted for the literary sources 
attribution of Cretans as “mercantile” and “greedy”.  
 In contrast to Rhodes, Crete was largely unable to unify its many poleis during the 
Hellenistic period. The epigraphic sources we have from Crete point to many treaties between 
and alliances against other Cretan poleis, but the closest that Hellenistic Crete ever came to 
political unity was expressed in the existence of the island-wide “Koinon”. A koinon is an 
agreement between polies to act as a unit in governmental affairs, where each poleis has 
representatives and makes decisions regarding common issues. S. Ager states that “the Koinon of 
Hellenistic Crete was a somewhat looser structure than other federations, and this impression is 
reinforced by what little we know of the vicissitudes of the Koinon's history.”244 Apparently, if 
Gortyn and Knossos, the largest poleis of Hellenistic Crete, were at peace or allied, the Koinon 
would exist.245 If they were at odds, the Koinon fell apart.  
Politically, Hellenistic Crete was dominated by three main bodies of political power, and 
headed by the three poleis at various times. Mainly, Gorytn controlled Lyttos, Arkades, Ariaian, 
Kyrtakinia;  Knossos controlled the larger poleis of Praisos, Itanos, as well as seventeen smaller 
entities; Phaistos, controlled Metala and Polyrhenia (see Map 3).246 Hierapytra was also an 
important player, taking over the territory of Praisos in 145 BC, destroying Itanos, and gaining 
economic clout throughout the rest of the Hellenistic period.247 These political spheres changed 
rapidly over time due to rivalries between each of these groups. Gortyn and Knossos are an 
excellent example. Ager highlights the fighting between these dominant poleis above, though in 
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the Oath of Dreros, Gortyn allied with Knossos against Lyttos.248 Similarly, Kydonia and 
Polyrhenia fought frequently over the lands of the Temple of Diktynna.249 Spyridakis gives a 
multitude of reasons for Cretan conflicts, including the control over sanctuaries, violations of 
treaties, land owndership, resource control, and the hegemony of Cretan poleis.250 When the 
Ptolemies had substantial control over cities or regions, according to Spyridakis, Crete saw 
peace, but the death of Ptolemy Philopater lead to “antagonistic” Eteocretan states.251 Such 
internal political strife, though not uncommon in the Hellenistic world, would have facilitated the 
negative stereotypes on Cretan piracy.  
Cretan Pirates 
As noted above, ancient literary sources and modern historians repeatedly state that 
Hellenistic Crete was full of pirates. When the modern reader hears the word “pirate”, 
connotations of bands of sailors with no government attachments come to mind – they rape, 
pillage, plunder, and otherwise wreak havoc upon the coastal towns that they can reach by ship. 
Perlman uses modern international law to define piracy as “an act of violence committed upon 
the high seas or upon land by descent from the sea that would be felonious if done ashore by one 
not acting under the authority of a politically organized community”.252 Such a definition works 
well in the context of modern states and governments, because it is usually clear who may be 
working as pirates and who is sanctioned. Indeed, it is also useful when analyzing Crete and its 
pirates – in order to determine if piracy was indeed happening at the society-wide level that is 
implied by the ancient sources. In short, was ‘piracy’ occurring when Cretan cities were at war, 
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and these “pirates” are only labeled as such by the defending party? Both de Souza and 
Gabrielsen discuss ‘piracy’ in the context of legitimate warfare and conclude that the ancient 
definition of piracy was not as clear as our modern one.253  War was often followed by 
plundering the town and surrounding areas in ancient times - a legitimate right for victors after 
the defeat of the enemy – and would look very similar to acts of piracy under other 
circumstances. Indeed, even the language of piracy is difficult to ascertain, as de Souza points 
out in attempting to distinguish between banditry and piracy. “Ancient Greek has two common 
words which can be translated as pirate, ληστης (leistes) and πειρατης (peirates). . . There is only 
one word in Greek which means a pirate, not a bandit: καταποντιστης (katapontistes), which 
translates literally as ‘one who throws into the sea’. . . It is not a commonly used word in Greek 
literature. . .”254 de Souza claims this distinction between bandits and pirates is important 
because during the Hellenistic period many words loosely meaning pirate are used  
typically to refer to acts of maritime armed robbery which meet with [Thucydides 
and Polybius’] disapproval, for one reason or another, but the variety of contexts 
in which they employ them, ranging from the aristocratic raiding of Homeric 
times to seaborne plundering on behalf of the Hellenistic kings, are a strong 
warning against simply placing all such references under the heading of ‘piracy’, 
and assuming that they had an unchanging, negative image in the eyes of 
contemporaries.255 
 
When viewing Polybius, especially, this information is crucial. In all cases where piracy is 
invoked, one must critically engage with the context of the event. Who would gain from labeling 
the opposing forces as pirates? For example, one may look at Polybius’ bias in Nabis of Sparta’s 
interactions with Crete, when he states that “he took part in piracy with the Cretans; he filled the 
Peloponnese with temple-looters, robbers, murderers. . .”256 This may indicate an alliance of 
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Sparta and one or two cities of Crete, or that Nabis may have hired Cretan mercenaries, and they 
then proceeded to infiltrate the Peloponnese. Again, this is not to deny that true piracy existed – 
of course, it must have – but rather, to question what kinds of activity are meant each time an 
ancient author discusses piracy.  
de Souza discusses this topic thoroughly and explores the impact of labeling the enemy as 
pirates. He says that “. . . it was generally expected that an expeditionary force would not only 
carry out coastal raids and attack ‘enemy’ shipping . . . but might also extort money from 
supposedly allied coastal cities and maritime traders”, and therefore anyone who was aware of 
these raids could use the incident to slander their opponent.257 This political tactic was used in 
several cases in history. Two examples that de Souza notes are when Philip II labeled the 
Athenians as pirates in an attempt to sway the Greek poleis to gain support for his warfare 
against the Athenians, and when the tyrant Alexander of Pherai who used a fleet of “pirate ships” 
to defeat the Athenians.258 The latter resulted in Xenephon recording his actions in history as 
nothing more than a lawless pirate – though he was obviously much more.259 Furthermore de 
Souza agrees that the powerful kingdoms and poleis could improve their image through the guise 
of suppressing piracy, using it to further their aggressive hegemonic aims, as is argued in the 
case of Rhodes above.260 Returning to the work of Paula Perlman and her argument that if 
Rhodes had an interest in attacking Crete for their own hegemonic aims, slandering them as 
pirates in order to attack them would be no new tactic.261 History would then record Crete as 
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piratical, instead of acknowledging the clear evidence for economic success that has been evident 
from the discussion above.262  
Moreover, it seems nearly impossible to prove in the ancient record that pirates were at 
work. What would piracy look like in the archaeological record? An attempt to find Cretan 
pirates in the archaeological record comes from the site of Phalasarna. It is located on the west 
side of Crete, situated on the coast near Cape Grambousa (see Map 3, above.). Called a harbor 
town, excavator Elpida Hadjidaki has labeled this Classical and Hellenistic site as a “famous 
Cretan pirate nest”.263 Mentioned by both Polybius and Strabo, Phalasarna was known as the 
most western port of Crete, and Strabo uses it as a reference point within his Geography.264 
Excavators discovered a large fortification wall that enclosed the harbor, and that there may have 
been two lines of fortification walls extending southeast, to protect the land east of the town (see 
Fig. 2).265 Large structures deemed of significant importance were an “artificial closed harbor”, a 
“throne possibly dedicated to Poseidon”266, a sandstone quarry, and a few fortification towers, 
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one of which was round.267 
    
Fig. 2: The site of Phalasarna. 
  The preliminary report of this site is mostly speculation, as the excavated material had 
not been fully analyzed, and Hadjidaki relied primarily on the literary evidence of Phalasarna to 
direct her interpretations of the above structures. The excavation of the round tower, however, 
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did put forth interesting questions on the defense of the city – as the tower looks different from 
other harbor towers known in the Hellenistic period.268 Once a final excavation report of 
Phalasarna came out in 1990, however, it was noted that this round tower was most likely a 
cistern, not a defense tower or fish tank.269 The evidence for this is debatable. Frost and Hajidaki 
postulate that the blocks leading into the channels would have allowed for rainwater collection 
and that a cistern would be useful in a pirate town where it could resupply ships and hold out 
during periods of siege.270  
This information is, of course, based on the assumption that the town was a pirate nest. 
After the cistern, the “artificial closed harbor” is the next most significant find. In the final 
report, it was re-interpreted as a “brackish lagoon”, with no connection to the main harbor.271 
Frost and Hajidaki believed that Phalasarna was destroyed in the mid-2nd century by the Romans 
and Marcus Antonius’ campaign when they were clearing the seas of pirates.272 This is serious 
speculation. If one looks clearly at the evidence, there could be a variety of conclusions that may 
be drawn other than piracy. The most obvious conclusion that comes to mind when one 
eliminates the literary sources and looks mainly at the archaeological evidence is that this site 
was a commercial harbor. Frost and Hadjidaki disagree with this, claiming that there was no 
evidence of commercial activity, that the harbor was not large enough to facilitate the movement 
of merchant vessels, and that the fortifications of the harbor would indicate more violence than a 
port of trade.273 The lack of commercial evidence – that is to say, pottery, coins, and loom 
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weights – however, may be due to the incomplete nature of the archaeological record or the 
incomplete nature of the excavation.  de Souza even points out that “agriculture, trade in stone, 
commercial links with nearby Polyrrhenia and later Egypt, and the service of local mercenaries 
overseas, are all attested in some form [at Phalasarna], and seem to provide adequate 
explanations for the city’s relative prosperity.”274 Such is the danger of accepting Cretan piracy 
wholesale. The “Cretan Mirage” effectively blinded these excavators to interpretations other than 
the mainstream conceptions of Hellenistic Crete. 
There are so many references to it and our evidence so incomplete, however, that it is 
impossible to claim Crete was free of any form of piracy. Instead it is the pervasiveness of the 
image that can be addressed – why were all Cretans branded as immoral or pirates? First, is it 
possible that some areas of Crete were participating in the Hellenistic hegemonic race, like its 
neighbors  Rhodes, the Ptolemies, the Seleukids, and the Antigonids did? As seen above, warfare 
and piracy were related in terms of plundering and attack. Or were these ‘pirates’ actually 
individual regions/cities protecting their economic interests in the Aegean? There is strong 
evidence for Cretans’ connections with many entities in the Aegean, and just as the Rhodians, 
they may have needed protection. Or did the lack of unity and the marginalization of Crete in the 
public eye lead others to believe that Cretans operating outside of the island of Crete were 
automatically pirates? After all, if there was no central political organization (as the marginal 
perception of Crete would attest), no Cretan marine force could be legitimate. Thus, they would 
be pirates. At this point, it is impossible to prove any of these claims. There is evidence that 
Cretans may have been slandered profusely though the label as ‘pirate’, as de Souza and Perlman 
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have made clear.275 In light of such claims, these are options that scholars may investigate as an 
alternative to the stereotypical, marginalized, Cretan.  
Rhodes and Crete: A Comparative Analysis 
Hellenistic Rhodes, as investigated in the case study in Chapter 3, was clearly an 
economic and political power during the Hellenistic period. It engaged in substantial inter-
regional trade that brought its products all over the Mediterranean. The island was also a 
stopping point on trade routes, which allowed it to profit through taxation of marketable goods 
and services. Politically unified, it could stand against the forces of Demetrius Poliorketes. The 
literary sources place Rhodes at the top of the moral ladder as a protector of free trade and a 
destroyer of pirates. Politically savvy through its mediation of potential military conflicts, it 
could also support the best navy in the Aegean (after the fall of Ptolemaic naval power) when it 
needed to protect its interests. When the earthquake that damaged the Colossus struck the island, 
Greek poleis and kings rushed forth to help – enough so that Rhodes was able to make a profit 
off of such a terrible disaster. In many ways, Rhodes was the golden child of the Hellenistic 
period – autonomous, wealthy and politically connected. It was located in the correct place, 
ignored by or allied to the larger kingdoms, and was able to navigate successfully the constantly 
changing political atmosphere through strategic alliances or neutrality.  
As we’ve seen, ancient literary sources marginalized Crete to the most dramatic degree as 
greedy, unorganized, murdering, lying, dishonorable, cowardly pirates and mercenaries. Crete’s 
allies are few and far between, according to the sources – not many would come to the aid of 
Crete. However, much of this beleaguered image can be explained away as part of the “Cretan 
Mirage”. In essence, our evidence points to more trade than is acknowledged, and there is even 
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evidence that Cretan economic activity and prosperity spiked during this period.  Despite the fact 
that Crete did not unify completely, it did have larger unifications that were powerful in their 
own right – such as the cities of Gortyn, Knossos, and Hierapytna. The connections to the 
mainland by various Cretan polies may be relatively few, but they are large powers such as 
Athens and the Ptolemies.  
Was Crete really that much different from Rhodes? Yes and no. 
In 205 BC, Rhodes attacked Crete in what is now understood to be the First Cretan War. This 
attack on the pirates of Crete, I believe, is evidence that Crete was on a very similar level as 
Rhodes in the Hellenistic period. Threatened by its rising prosperity, Rhodes needed to protect its 
hegemonic aims and goals, as well as its economic ties through ensuring that Crete did not rise 
completely to its level. Later, Rome would do very much the same, under the guise of piracy.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 Through investigating the source of bias in ancient historians, re-examining the 
archaeological evidence, applying economic theory, understanding political strategy, and using a 
bit of interpretation, the “Cretan Mirage” has been dispelled. It is not true that Crete was piratical 
in essence – rather, these ancient people and their poleis are as dynamic and opportunistic as any 
of the other Greek poleis during the Hellenistic period. Crete’s many cities were operating on the 
Aegean trade network, building their economic power, spreading the culture and goods of Crete 
to other Greeks. It had the connections, the economic clout, and the material production to be a 
major competitor to Rhodes, and Rhodes attacked Crete for these reasons. Mirages such as the 
“Cretan Mirage” are dangerous within scholarship, because they are difficult to detect and they 
impair the ability of researchers to objectively analyze the past. In this instance, piracy played a 
large role in the mirage. Our modern understanding of what pirates are and what they do are not 
the same as ancient notions of piracy. Piracy was used against Crete to slander its reputation and 
all but erase it from Hellenistic history. I would like to end by again quoting Polybius, as he was 
correct in one aspect:  
For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate 
knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we must conclude that 
episodical history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge and 
secure grasp of universal history. While it is only by the combination and 
comparison of the separate parts of the whole,—by observing their likeness and 
their difference,—that a man can attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear 
and complete; and thus secure both the profit and the delight of History.276 
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